[EM] "Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole)" candidate in poll

Chris Benham cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au
Thu Apr 11 20:36:46 PDT 2024


Ted,

  Thanks for that explanation.

> while margin sorted approval is an excellent method, the approval 
> cutoff (what I prefer to think of as a preference cutoff, since all 
> ranked candidates are approved)

I haven't heard that version suggested, and it isn't what I had in mind 
when I nominated it in the poll, as  I specified at the time.

> MarginsSorted Approval (specified cutoff):
>
> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can 
> also specify an approval
> cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below 
> no others (i.e. ranked top
> or equal-top).

It occurred to to suggest separate  "technical merit" and 
"bang-for-buck" polls, but people have different (and/or not clear) 
ideas on exactly what is "bang" and what is "buck".

Another idea is to talk about what we consider to be the best and/or 
acceptable balloting rules, and those that are or are likely to be 
imposed by the "real world".

And then we could have separate polls on methods for the different 
ballot rules. Some methods are much more sensitive to these details than 
others.

With the poll as it is I top-rank Margins Sorted Approval (specified 
cutoff) but other methods (such as this one you nominated) might make it 
to equal-top on my final ballot.

>
> A Forrest Simmons invention. Candidates are listed in approval score 
> order and if any adjacent pairs
> are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by flipping the 
> out-of-order pair with the smallest
> margin. If there is a tie for this we flip the less approved pair. 
> Repeat until there are no adjacent pairs
> of candidates that are pairwise out of order, then elect the 
> highest-ordered candidate.

More later.

Chris


On 12/04/2024 9:27 am, Ted Stern wrote:
> PS to previous:
>
> Since the condorcet winner doesn't have a min lv score, minlv score 
> could be either 0%, 100%, or 50% by default.
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 16:54 Ted Stern <dodecatheon at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>     Chris, what I nominated for the poll was essentially the same as
>     what you proposed in October of 2016, but simplified to require no
>     elimination step iteration. Just one margin sort on MinLV(erw).
>
>     http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2016-October/000599.html
>
>     ERW means that if A and B have equal rank above bottom, we fill in
>     the pairwise array as if it were one whole vote of A>B and one
>     whole vote of B>A.
>
>     The reason I proposed it is that seeding the margin sort with
>     MinLV score in descending order is analogous to minimum pairwise
>     opposition in ascending order. MinMaxPO is burial resistant, the
>     property we're looking for, and for margin sort, we want a metric
>     that is analogous to approval, with descending scores.
>
>     If we wanted the /exact/ complement, we would do margin sort on
>     /min votes/, to get the closest approximation to MinMaxPO(wv)
>     possible while still being Smith compliant. However, minmax (or
>     rather maxmin) is not clone proof, as can be seen by applying
>     margin sort min votes to the example you posted last week:
>
>     http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2024-April/005616.html
>
>     By using minLV instead of min votes, C's minimum score of 18 (with
>     clone) is ignored and so the seed ranking before margin sort is
>     unchanged by the addition of the clone.
>
>     My motivation for the nomination: while margin sorted approval is
>     an excellent method, the approval cutoff (what I prefer to think
>     of as a preference cutoff, since all ranked candidates are
>     approved) is an additional step, requiring either an additional
>     count for implicit approval, or an extra mental judgment by the
>     voter.
>
>     Margin Sorted MinLV(erw) is automatic, and from my limited
>     testing, tends to find a candidate with strong top ratings.
>
>     On Thu, Apr 11, 2024, 01:17 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>     wrote:
>
>         Ted,
>
>         I'm not completely clear on what the "equal rated whole" part
>         means, and likely there are some other possible
>         voters who have no idea what any of it means.
>
>         This is what I think it all means.
>
>         Voters rank the candidates from the top, equal ranking an
>         truncation allowed.  Then we construct a pairwise matrix.
>
>         A ballot voting A over B gives one vote in the A-B comparison
>         to A and nothing to B.   A ballot that truncates (or votes
>         equal-bottom) both A and B gives nothing to both in the A-B
>         comparison.
>
>         But in the case a ballot explicitly votes A=B above bottom, do
>         you propose that the ballot give a whole vote each to
>         A and B in the A-B comparison? (Until I hear otherwise from
>         you, I'll assume this is  what you mean.)
>
>         An alternative reasonable idea would be for this to be only
>         the case where the ballot votes A and B below no other
>         candidates, and if they are voted A=B above bottom but below
>         top then the ballot gives half a vote to each of A and
>         B in the A-B comparison.
>
>         In any case I understand that we  score each candidate
>         according to the minimum number of votes they got in a pairwise
>         loss, and order them from highest to lowest.
>
>         Then candidates are listed in  score order and if any adjacent
>         pairs are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by
>         flipping the out-of-order pair with the smallest margin. If
>         there is a tie for this we flip the lowest scored tied pair.
>         Repeat until
>         there are no adjacent pairs of candidates that are pairwise
>         out of order, then elect the highest-ordered candidate.
>
>         I am favourably disposed to this, but I'd like some
>         clarification (and hopefully some de-confusing justification)
>         on the issue
>         of how we treat equal ranking (or "rating").
>
>         Chris Benham
>
>
>>
>>         *Ted Stern*dodecatheon at gmail.com
>>         <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAHGFzOTaPTdMnVw7TELxExvM4ZjbAEtaxJWZ-%2Bpcttf4ATXhPw%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
>>         /Sat Apr 6 12:33:35 PDT 2024/
>>
>>
>>         ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>         I'd like to nominate
>>
>>         Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole)
>
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