[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR

Thu Apr 11 00:57:20 PDT 2024

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 00:19 Michael Garman <michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
wrote:

> > The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>
> You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates are
> viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
>

Of course. Some mistakes are natural.

Realism??

You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only choices??

It’s nonsense. You think  most voters want an an evil?

People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
Republocratic policies.

Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive than
the Republicrats & their policies.

Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
shows that people want.

Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.

>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:12 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:29 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>
>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>> Republican.
>>>
>>>
>>> That must be a very tight squeeze.
>>>
>>
>> :-D
>>
>>
>>>
>>> But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>
>>>
>>> That is what I meant.
>>>
>>>
>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very  long way from the
>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I hope you are right.
>>>
>>
>> But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the same
>>> set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>
>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>
>>>
>>> I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that they
>>> can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
>>>
>>
>> …if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that out,
>> when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
>> candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
>>
>> A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
>> when sincerity is regretted.
>>
>> Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another progressive.
>> But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good enough. One
>> should *maximally* protect the acceptables.  …often that requires
>> favorite-burial.
>>
>> I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed. It
>> illustrated  that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW because
>> you ranked sincerely. Not good.
>>
>> They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
>> circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
>>
>> I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
>> elections or polls.
>>
>> IRV isn’t Hare. It’s *FairVote* Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes it
>> effectively a different method.
>>
>>
>>
>>> And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their vote
>>> other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
>>> candidate will win.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
>> giveaway-suckers.
>>
>> Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
>>
>> There was a novel called _I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to me_.
>>
>> Sad.
>>
>> The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Michael
>>>
>> On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
>>> candidates too.
>>>
>>> But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
>>> there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
>>> with most non wv Condorcet.)
>>>
>>> So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
>>>
>>> …& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
>>> vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
>>>
>>> So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
>>>
>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>
>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>> Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>
>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very  long way from the
>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>
>>> As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
>>> voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>> acceptables.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
>>>> known clear front-runners
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality) would
>>> work fine.
>>>
>>>>
>>> and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
>>>> fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and which
>>>> are not.
>>>>
>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the same
>>>> set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>
>>>
>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>
>>> But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
>>> (admittedly worse in VF1.).
>>>
>>> But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
>>> complex count & its consequences.
>>>
>>>
>>> and benefit from the method's compliance with
>>>> Clone-Winner.  And if there are known front-runners and you insist on
>>>> voting super-safe then  I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
>>>> candidate you
>>>> would in FPP.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
>>>> nightmare.  Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
>>>> lower.
>>>>
>>> Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods,
>>> including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
>>>
>>> But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud
>>> insecurity & vulnerability.
>>>
>>> You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I don’t
>>> propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll, in
>>> which I’ve just now voted.
>>>
>>> I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
>>> one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
>>> even simpler than RP.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Michael
>>>>
>>>> On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Michael wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>
>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> No it doesn't.   Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
>>>>> STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I said “some”, not “all”.
>>>>
>>>> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
>>>> acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
>>>>
>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>> acceptables.
>>>>
>>>> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror of
>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>
>>>>> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
>>>>>
>>>>> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
>>>>> sincere favourite as low as possible*.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I
>>>> don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR.  … completely reject runoff
>>>> with Approval.  …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
>>>>
>>>> I much prefer Approval to Score,  for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence or
>>>>> common sense because STAR is obviously
>>>>> so silly and arbitrary.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> See above.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable Vote
>>>>> with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
>>>>> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
>>>>> Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
>>>>> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions) and
>>>>> Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
>>>>>
>>>>> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
>>>>> It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
>>>>> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to suggest
>>>>> that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> [quote]
>>>>> Score is Approval with a  "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>
>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>
>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>
>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>
>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>
>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>
>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>
>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>
>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>
>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>
>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>>>> insist on one.
>>>>>
>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases  Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>
>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>
>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal  (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and  be much more
>>>>>> likely  a sincere Condorcet winner.  Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
>>>>>> in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".   ("Sky-high"
>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
>>>>>> It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (1) the method isn't  Hare,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by  not-so-deep
>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website:    https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and  general
>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just  propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires
>>>>>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
>>>>>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
>>>>>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
>>>>>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49,   Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
>>>>>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
>>>>>> If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
>>>>>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's  vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
>>>>>> to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise.  But STAR is much more
>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
>>>>>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars.  If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>>>> might
>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>>>> supporting
>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>>> Betrayal Criterion.  I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>>    incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>>    worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
>>>>>>    race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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