[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR

Thu Apr 11 01:00:02 PDT 2024

I don’t think they’re our only potential choices in a vacuum , but I do
think they’re the only people who have a chance of winning the election
this year. Big difference. Speaking of the polls, I think you’ll find they
support this conclusion.

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:57 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 00:19 Michael Garman <
> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>
>> > The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>
>> You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates
>> are viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.
>>
>
> Of course. Some mistakes are natural.
>
> Realism??
>
> You think it’s realistic to believe two evil are really our only choices??
>
> It’s nonsense. You think  most voters want an an evil?
>
> People want better parties. The policies that people want are not the
> Republocratic policies.
>
> Chomsky has long pointed out that the public are much more progressive
> than the Republicrats & their policies.
>
> Look at the Greens’ platform. It’s closer to what polling consistently
> shows that people want.
>
> Don’t believe the bullshit about “ The Two Choices”.
>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:12 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:29 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>
>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>> Republican.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That must be a very tight squeeze.
>>>>
>>>
>>> :-D
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That is what I meant.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very  long way from the
>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I hope you are right.
>>>>
>>>
>>> But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the same
>>>> set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>
>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that they
>>>> can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
>>>>
>>>
>>> …if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that out,
>>> when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
>>> candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
>>>
>>> A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s
>>> when sincerity is regretted.
>>>
>>> Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another progressive.
>>> But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good enough. One
>>> should *maximally* protect the acceptables.  …often that requires
>>> favorite-burial.
>>>
>>> I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed. It
>>> illustrated  that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW because
>>> you ranked sincerely. Not good.
>>>
>>> They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
>>> circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
>>>
>>> I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
>>> elections or polls.
>>>
>>> IRV isn’t Hare. It’s *FairVote* Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes it
>>> effectively a different method.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their
>>>> vote other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
>>>> candidate will win.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
>>> giveaway-suckers.
>>>
>>> Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
>>>
>>> There was a novel called _I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to
>>> me_.
>>>
>>> Sad.
>>>
>>> The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Michael
>>>>
>>> On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
>>>> candidates too.
>>>>
>>>> But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if
>>>> there might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial
>>>> with most non wv Condorcet.)
>>>>
>>>> So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
>>>>
>>>> …& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
>>>> vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
>>>>
>>>> So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
>>>>
>>>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>>>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>>>
>>>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>>>> Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>>>
>>>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very  long way from the
>>>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>>>
>>>> As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
>>>> voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
>>>>> known clear front-runners
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality) would
>>>> work fine.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
>>>>> fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and which
>>>>> are not.
>>>>>
>>>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the
>>>>> same set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>>>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>>>
>>>> But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
>>>> (admittedly worse in VF1.).
>>>>
>>>> But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
>>>> complex count & its consequences.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> and benefit from the method's compliance with
>>>>> Clone-Winner.  And if there are known front-runners and you insist on
>>>>> voting super-safe then  I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
>>>>> candidate you
>>>>> would in FPP.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
>>>>> nightmare.  Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
>>>>> lower.
>>>>>
>>>> Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods,
>>>> including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
>>>>
>>>> But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud
>>>> insecurity & vulnerability.
>>>>
>>>> You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I don’t
>>>> propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll, in
>>>> which I’ve just now voted.
>>>>
>>>> I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on
>>>> one. I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something
>>>> even simpler than RP.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael
>>>>>
>>>>> On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Michael wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No it doesn't.   Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.
>>>>>> STAR trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I said “some”, not “all”.
>>>>>
>>>>> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
>>>>> acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
>>>>>
>>>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>>>> acceptables.
>>>>>
>>>>> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror
>>>>>> of STAR.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their
>>>>>> sincere favourite as low as possible*.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I
>>>>> don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR.  … completely reject runoff
>>>>> with Approval.  …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
>>>>>
>>>>> I much prefer Approval to Score,  for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence or
>>>>>> common sense because STAR is obviously
>>>>>> so silly and arbitrary.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> See above.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable Vote
>>>>>> with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
>>>>>> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
>>>>>> Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
>>>>>> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions) and
>>>>>> Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".
>>>>>> It's ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
>>>>>> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to suggest
>>>>>> that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [quote]
>>>>>> Score is Approval with a  "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>>>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>>>>> insist on one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases  Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal  (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and  be much more
>>>>>>> likely  a sincere Condorcet winner.  Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
>>>>>>> (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".   ("Sky-high"
>>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
>>>>>>> It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (1) the method isn't  Hare,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by  not-so-deep
>>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website:    https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and  general
>>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just  propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which
>>>>>>> requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
>>>>>>> is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
>>>>>>> and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49,   Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
>>>>>>> Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
>>>>>>> If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
>>>>>>> Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's  vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
>>>>>>> to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise.  But STAR is much more
>>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
>>>>>>> that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars.  If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>>>>> might
>>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>>>>> supporting
>>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>>>> Betrayal Criterion.  I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>    Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>>>    incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>    Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>>>    worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>    Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
>>>>>>>    the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
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