[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR

Thu Apr 11 00:19:30 PDT 2024

> The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.

You say pessimism; I say realism. If only two objectionable candidates are
viable, it’s only natural to pick the less objectionable one.

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 9:12 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 23:29 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
>>
>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>
>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>> Republican.
>>
>>
>> That must be a very tight squeeze.
>>
>
> :-D
>
>
>>
>> But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>
>>
>> That is what I meant.
>>
>>
>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very  long way from the
>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>
>>
>>
>> I hope you are right.
>>
>
> But progressives can’t seem to let go of their awful lesser-evil.
>
>>
>>
>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the same
>> set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>
>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>
>>
>> I didn't say "candidate" singular, I said "set of candidates" that they
>> can vote together above all others, in whatever order they like.
>>
>
> …if they can count on eachother’s solidarity. I used to point that out,
> when I was defending Hare. But some supporters of the more distant
> candidates you like might transfer the other way if they get eliminated.
>
> A mutual-majority are safe, but there isn’t always mutuality…& that’s when
> sincerity is regretted.
>
> Probably one progressive’s voters will transfer to another progressive.
> But, when there are unacceptables, then “probably” isn’t good enough. One
> should *maximally* protect the acceptables.  …often that requires
> favorite-burial.
>
> I’ve seen the sincerity-regret in the only IRV poll that I observed. It
> illustrated  that their use of IRV was a mistake. You lose the CW because
> you ranked sincerely. Not good.
>
> They should have used RP(wv). (In case there might be a natural
> circular-tie, RP is better than MinMax.)
>
> I like Hare for Pizza toppings & movies. Not for public political
> elections or polls.
>
> IRV isn’t Hare. It’s *FairVote* Hare. Their dishonest promotion makes it
> effectively a different method.
>
>
>
>> And a lot of voters are interested in doing other things with their vote
>> other than just maximising the chance that an "acceptable"
>> candidate will win.
>>
>
> Yes, a lot of voters are making a big mistake. Lesser-evil
> giveaway-suckers.
>
> Yes, some regard evil as acceptable if it’s “lesser”.
>
> There was a novel called _I’ve been down so long, it looks like up to me_.
>
> Sad.
>
> The pessimism of lesser-evil voters is astounding.
>
>>
>>
>> Michael
>>
> On 11/04/2024 3:25 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>>
>> You’re right—The runoff messes up STAR’s strategy with unacceptable
>> candidates too.
>>
>> But IRV shares the problem. I most non-wv Condorcet have it too, if there
>> might be successful burial (& there might easily be undeterred burial with
>> most non wv Condorcet.)
>>
>> So it isn’t a problem of only STAR.
>>
>> …& the ranked-methods have their completely prohibitive count-fraud
>> vulnerability problem, due to their complex count.
>>
>> So I ranked STAR over the ranked methods.
>>
>> Different topic: In a different post, you said that Approval tend to
>> favor centrists. FairVote says that, but it isn’t true.
>>
>> In this country, Centrist are candidates between the Democrat & the
>> Republican. But Approval favors the voter-median.
>>
>> The Democrats & Republicans are a very, very  long way from the
>> voter-median, which is Progressive.
>>
>> As I keep saying, Approval’s Myerson-Weber equilibrium is at the
>> voter-median. Approval will soon home-in on the CW.
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 19:59 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>> acceptables.
>>>
>>>
>>> It sounds like you are talking about a situation where there are no
>>> known clear front-runners
>>>
>>
>>
>> If we knew who the frontrunners are, VF1 (Vote-For-1, Plurality) would
>> work fine.
>>
>>>
>> and the supporters of the candidates you deem acceptable don't
>>> fully agree with you about which candidates are acceptable and which are
>>> not.
>>>
>>> Because if they do agree with you then they will all just vote the same
>>> set of acceptable candidates above all the others
>>>
>>
>> If all progressives had that kind of information, which candidate to
>> combine on, then VF1 would work fine.
>>
>> But yes, IRV & VF1 are alike in that way, sharing the same problem
>> (admittedly worse in VF1.).
>>
>> But who wants that problem? …especially when paying the price of a
>> complex count & its consequences.
>>
>>
>> and benefit from the method's compliance with
>>> Clone-Winner.  And if there are known front-runners and you insist on
>>> voting super-safe then  I suppose you can top-rank the same Compromise
>>> candidate you
>>> would in FPP.
>>>
>>
>> Exactly ! Favorite-burial defensive-strategy, in both methods.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Not a big burden to lose sleep over and nothing like the STAR
>>> nightmare.  Overall the strategic risk of voting sincerely in Hare is much
>>> lower.
>>>
>> Star’s runoff brings big strategy-problems, as do many other methods,
>> including IRV & margins Condorcet, etc.
>>
>> But at least it doesn’t share ranked-methods’ prohibitive count-fraud
>> insecurity & vulnerability.
>>
>> You know…the lesser of two evils. Well, I don’t choose evils, & I don’t
>> propose STAR. But I ranked it over the ranked-methods, in our poll, in
>> which I’ve just now voted.
>>
>> I wouldn’t propose a ranked method unless a jurisdiction insisted on one.
>> I’d then offer RP(wv), or maybe MinMax(wv), if they wanted something even
>> simpler than RP.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Michael
>>>
>>> On 11/04/2024 10:56 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 18:04 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Michael wrote:
>>>>
>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>
>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No it doesn't.   Score meets Favorite Betrayal and Participation.  STAR
>>>> trashes those just for Condorcet Loser.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I said “some”, not “all”.
>>>
>>> e.g. If there are unacceptable candidates, then just give max to the
>>> acceptables, & zero to the unacceptables.
>>>
>>> IRV? Try to rank the acceptables in order of winnability. …trying &
>>> hoping to match the ranking-order of the other preferrers of some of your
>>> acceptables.
>>>
>>> Questionable guesswork. An intractable strategic morass.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I could even make up a new criterion just to encapsulate the horror of
>>>> STAR.
>>>>
>>>> The Favourite Ultra-Betrayal Criterion:
>>>>
>>>> *Voters should never have any strategic incentive to vote their sincere
>>>> favourite as low as possible*.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes,, & isn’t that true with *any* runoff? It occurred to me too, I
>>> don’t like it. I much prefer Score to STAR.  … completely reject runoff
>>> with Approval.  …unless a jurisdiction insists on it.
>>>
>>> I much prefer Approval to Score,  for minimalness & unarbitrariness.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Hare should be much easier to sell to anyone with any intelligence or
>>>> common sense because STAR is obviously
>>>> so silly and arbitrary.
>>>>
>>>
>>> See above.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Where as Hare just seeks to replace the Single Non-Transferable Vote
>>>> with the Single Transferable Vote, keeping compliance
>>>> with Plurality, Dominant Candidate, Clone-Loser, Later-no-Harm and
>>>> Later-no-Help but losing Participation and Mono-Raise to gain
>>>> Dominant Coalition (and therefore Majority for Solid Coalitions) and
>>>> Dominant Mutual Third and Clone-Winner.
>>>>
>>>> It has what Woodall referred to as a "maximal set of properties".  It's
>>>> ok not to like it if you are a fundamentalist about some criterion
>>>> compliance it doesn't have (like Condorcet or FBC) but not to suggest
>>>> that complete garbage like STAR is in some way preferable.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 11/04/2024 5:04 am, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> [quote]
>>>> Score is Approval with a  "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>> [/quote]
>>>>
>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>
>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>
>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>
>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>
>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>
>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>
>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
>>>> the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
>>>> greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
>>>> & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>
>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>
>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>
>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>>> insist on one.
>>>>
>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>
>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases  Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>
>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>
>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>
>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
>>>> security.
>>>>
>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>
>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>> Favorite Betrayal  (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and  be much more
>>>>> likely  a sincere Condorcet winner.  Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>
>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
>>>>> in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".   ("Sky-high"
>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>
>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
>>>>> seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>
>>>>> (1) the method isn't  Hare,
>>>>>
>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>
>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by  not-so-deep
>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>
>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website:    https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>
>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and  general
>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>
>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just  propaganda nonsense:
>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>
>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires
>>>>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
>>>>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
>>>>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler Effect,"
>>>>> ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>
>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
>>>>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>
>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>
>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>
>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49,   Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
>>>>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
>>>>> If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>
>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
>>>>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's  vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
>>>>> to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise.  But STAR is much more
>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>
>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
>>>>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars.  If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>>> might
>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>
>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>>> supporting
>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>
>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>> Betrayal Criterion.  I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>
>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>
>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>
>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>
>>>>>    -
>>>>>
>>>>>    Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
>>>>>    <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>    -
>>>>>
>>>>>    Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>    worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>    -
>>>>>
>>>>>    Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
>>>>>    race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
>>>>> the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
>>>>> Hare.
>>>>>
>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ----
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