[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR

Wed Apr 10 16:35:25 PDT 2024

On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 16:33 Michael Garman <michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
wrote:

> >> Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
>
> So close! I was talking about her vaccine skepticism.
>

I hadn’t heard about that. But I can accept a policy that I disagree with
if it’s part of a platform that I otherwise like.

>
> Michael J. Garman | he/him
>
> Digital & Campus Organizer | Rank the Vote
>
> Book a meeting with me! <https://calendly.com/michael-j-garman>
>
> (401) 644-4108 | michael.garman at rankthevote.us
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:13 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 15:10 Michael Garman <
>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> >> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
>>> ballot in all states.
>>>
>>> She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.
>>>
>>> >> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein
>>>
>>> Her stance on Ukraine.
>>>
>>> >> Marianne Williamson
>>>
>>> Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
>>> claims.
>>>
>>
>> Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 12:05 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 13:55 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
>>>>> opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
>>>> ballot in all states.
>>>>
>>>> …& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
>>>>
>>>> Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
>>>> (candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
>>>> Williamson’s platform?
>>>>
>>>> on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
>>>>> enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
>>>> months?
>>>>
>>>> Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the
>>>>> race...
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
>>>>
>>>> ) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
>>>>> tolerable.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [quote]
>>>>>> Score is Approval with a  "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>>>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>>>>> insist on one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases  Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal  (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and  be much more
>>>>>>> likely  a sincere Condorcet winner.  Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
>>>>>>> (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".   ("Sky-high"
>>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
>>>>>>> It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (1) the method isn't  Hare,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by  not-so-deep
>>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website:    https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and  general
>>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just  propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which
>>>>>>> requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
>>>>>>> is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
>>>>>>> and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49,   Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
>>>>>>> Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
>>>>>>> If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
>>>>>>> Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's  vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
>>>>>>> to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise.  But STAR is much more
>>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
>>>>>>> that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars.  If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>>>>> might
>>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>>>>> supporting
>>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>>>> Betrayal Criterion.  I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>    Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>>>    incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>    Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>>>    worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>    Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
>>>>>>>    the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>
>>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>>
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