[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR

Wed Apr 10 16:38:12 PDT 2024

Fair enough.

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:35 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 16:33 Michael Garman <
> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>
>> >> Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
>>
>> So close! I was talking about her vaccine skepticism.
>>
>
> I hadn’t heard about that. But I can accept a policy that I disagree with
> if it’s part of a platform that I otherwise like.
>
>>
>> Michael J. Garman | he/him
>>
>> Digital & Campus Organizer | Rank the Vote
>>
>> Book a meeting with me! <https://calendly.com/michael-j-garman>
>>
>> (401) 644-4108 | michael.garman at rankthevote.us
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:13 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 15:10 Michael Garman <
>>> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> >> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
>>>> ballot in all states.
>>>>
>>>> She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.
>>>>
>>>> >> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein
>>>>
>>>> Her stance on Ukraine.
>>>>
>>>> >> Marianne Williamson
>>>>
>>>> Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
>>>> claims.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 12:05 AM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 13:55 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a
>>>>>> Democratic opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate
>>>>>> higher.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
>>>>> ballot in all states.
>>>>>
>>>>> …& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
>>>>>
>>>>> Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
>>>>> (candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
>>>>> Williamson’s platform?
>>>>>
>>>>> on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
>>>>>> enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
>>>>> months?
>>>>>
>>>>> Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the
>>>>>> race...
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
>>>>>
>>>>> ) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
>>>>>> tolerable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [quote]
>>>>>>> Score is Approval with a  "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote
>>>>>>> for the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions
>>>>>>> might insist on one.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases  Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal  (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and  be much more
>>>>>>>> likely  a sincere Condorcet winner.  Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff
>>>>>>>> (automated in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".   ("Sky-high"
>>>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
>>>>>>>> It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (1) the method isn't  Hare,
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by  not-so-deep
>>>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website:    https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a
>>>>>>>> serious issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and
>>>>>>>> RCV only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and  general
>>>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just  propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which
>>>>>>>> requires that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which
>>>>>>>> is as powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass
>>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant
>>>>>>>> Runoff Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy
>>>>>>>> the Equal Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague
>>>>>>>> and confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49,   Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose
>>>>>>>> Gore> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere
>>>>>>>> favourite).  If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The
>>>>>>>> Nader voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's  vulnerability to Push-over strategy has
>>>>>>>> said to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise.  But STAR is much more
>>>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In
>>>>>>>> that case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure
>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars.  If 5 stars then you are relying
>>>>>>>> on you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then
>>>>>>>> you might
>>>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on
>>>>>>>> their favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their
>>>>>>>> votes supporting
>>>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>>>>> Betrayal Criterion.  I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>    Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>>>>    incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>    Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>>>>    worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>    Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in
>>>>>>>>    the race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ----
>>>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>>>> list info
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>>
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