[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR

Wed Apr 10 16:33:15 PDT 2024

>> Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.

So close! I was talking about her vaccine skepticism.

Michael J. Garman | he/him

Digital & Campus Organizer | Rank the Vote

Book a meeting with me! <https://calendly.com/michael-j-garman>

(401) 644-4108 | michael.garman at rankthevote.us

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 1:13 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 15:10 Michael Garman <
> michael.garman at rankthevote.us> wrote:
>
>>
>> >> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
>> ballot in all states.
>>
>> She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.
>>
>> >> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein
>>
>> Her stance on Ukraine.
>>
>> >> Marianne Williamson
>>
>> Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
>> claims.
>>
>
> Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.
>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 12:05 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 13:55 Closed Limelike Curves <
>>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>> As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
>>>> opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
>>> ballot in all states.
>>>
>>> …& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
>>>
>>> Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
>>>>
>>>
>>> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
>>> (candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
>>> Williamson’s platform?
>>>
>>> on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
>>>> enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
>>>>
>>>
>>> But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
>>> months?
>>>
>>> Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the race...
>>>>
>>>
>>> You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
>>>
>>> ) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
>>>> tolerable.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> [quote]
>>>>> Score is Approval with a  "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>>> [/quote]
>>>>>
>>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>>
>>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>>
>>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>>
>>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>>
>>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>>
>>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>>
>>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves
>>>>> with the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary &
>>>>> (somewhat or greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the
>>>>> consequent expense & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>>
>>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>>
>>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>>
>>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>>>> insist on one.
>>>>>
>>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases  Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>>
>>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>>
>>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better
>>>>> count-fraud security.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>>> Favorite Betrayal  (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and  be much more
>>>>>> likely  a sincere Condorcet winner.  Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
>>>>>> in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".   ("Sky-high"
>>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad.
>>>>>> It seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (1) the method isn't  Hare,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by  not-so-deep
>>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website:    https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and  general
>>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just  propaganda nonsense:
>>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires
>>>>>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
>>>>>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
>>>>>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler
>>>>>> Effect," ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
>>>>>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49,   Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
>>>>>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
>>>>>> If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
>>>>>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's  vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
>>>>>> to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise.  But STAR is much more
>>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
>>>>>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
>>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars.  If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>>>> might
>>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>>>> supporting
>>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>>> Betrayal Criterion.  I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not
>>>>>>    incentivized. <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>>    worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>>    -
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
>>>>>>    race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I
>>>>>> refute the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are
>>>>>> of Hare.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ----
>>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for
>>>>> list info
>>>>>
>>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>>
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