[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR

Wed Apr 10 16:13:37 PDT 2024

On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 15:10 Michael Garman <michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
wrote:

>
> >> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
> ballot in all states.
>
> She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.
>
> >> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein
>
> Her stance on Ukraine.
>
> >> Marianne Williamson
>
> Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
> claims.
>

Oh, I guess it’s about anthropogenic global-warming.

>
>
> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 12:05 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 13:55 Closed Limelike Curves <
>> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>> As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
>>> opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
>>>
>>
>> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the ballot
>> in all states.
>>
>> …& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
>>
>> Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
>>>
>>
>> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
>> (candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
>> Williamson’s platform?
>>
>> on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
>>> enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
>>>
>>
>> But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
>> months?
>>
>> Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the race...
>>>
>>
>> You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
>>
>> ) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
>>> tolerable.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff <
>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> [quote]
>>>> Score is Approval with a  "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>>> [/quote]
>>>>
>>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>>
>>>> The right use of Score:
>>>>
>>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>>
>>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>>
>>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>>
>>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>>
>>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
>>>> the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
>>>> greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
>>>> & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>>
>>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>>
>>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>>
>>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>>> insist on one.
>>>>
>>>> …likewise Score.
>>>>
>>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases  Condorcet-efficiency &
>>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>>
>>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>>
>>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>>
>>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
>>>> security.
>>>>
>>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>>
>>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets
>>>>> Favorite Betrayal  (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and  be much more
>>>>> likely  a sincere Condorcet winner.  Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>>
>>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
>>>>> in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".   ("Sky-high"
>>>>> according to CLC here).
>>>>>
>>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
>>>>> seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>>
>>>>> (1) the method isn't  Hare,
>>>>>
>>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>>
>>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by  not-so-deep
>>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>>
>>>>> From the "equal-vote" website:    https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>>
>>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and  general
>>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>>
>>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just  propaganda nonsense:
>>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>>
>>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires
>>>>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
>>>>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
>>>>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler Effect,"
>>>>> ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>>
>>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
>>>>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>>
>>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about
>>>>> Hare (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>>
>>>>> 49 Bush
>>>>> 24 Gore
>>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>>
>>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49,   Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>>
>>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
>>>>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).
>>>>> If the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>>
>>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
>>>>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's  vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said
>>>>> to be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise.  But STAR is much more
>>>>> vulnerable
>>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>>
>>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
>>>>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
>>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars.  If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>>> might
>>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>>
>>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>>> supporting
>>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky
>>>>> (more likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with
>>>>> STAR.
>>>>>
>>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>>> Betrayal Criterion.  I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>>> fails FBC.
>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>>
>>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>>
>>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>>
>>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>>
>>>>>    -
>>>>>
>>>>>    Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
>>>>>    <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>>    -
>>>>>
>>>>>    Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your
>>>>>    worst case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>>    -
>>>>>
>>>>>    Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
>>>>>    race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
>>>>> the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
>>>>> Hare.
>>>>>
>>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ----
>>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>>> info
>>>>
>>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240410/4c539e13/attachment-0001.htm>