[EM] Hare (aka IRV) versus STAR

Wed Apr 10 15:10:45 PDT 2024

>> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the
ballot in all states.

She didn’t qualify for the ballot here in Rhode Island.

>> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein

Her stance on Ukraine.

>> Marianne Williamson

Her promotion of questionable — to pick a charitable word — scientific
claims.

On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 12:05 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 13:55 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
> As an example, I'd much prefer a situation where Biden had a Democratic
>> opponent listed separately on the ballot that I could rate higher.
>>
>
> Marianne Williamson is a genuine Progressive, & (I hope) in on the ballot
> in all states.
>
> …& should also be, with whatever voting-system.
>
> Right now, I'm not happy with any of the candidates in the race
>>
>
> What are you unhappy about, regarding Jill Stein, Marianne Williamson
> (candidate for the Democrat-nomination), or the Greens’ platform, or
> Williamson’s platform?
>
> on a simple left-right scale I'm close to Biden, but I'm not exactly
>> enthusiastic about an 82-year old president.
>>
>
> But you’re enthusiastic about what Biden has been doing during recent
> months?
>
> Though I'm sure as hell not supporting any other candidate in the race...
>>
>
> You sure as hell aren’t supporting a Progressive !!!
>
> ) With STAR, every voter has at least two candidates they consider
>> tolerable.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 12:36 PM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Apr 9, 2024 at 17:31 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> [quote]
>>> Score is Approval with a  "I wish to weaken the effect of my vote for
>>> the sake of being more sincere/expressive" box/button.
>>> [/quote]
>>>
>>> If that’s how you want to vote in Score, then suit yourself.
>>>
>>> The right use of Score:
>>>
>>> Use only min & max ratings. i.e. Use Score as Approval.
>>>
>>> …with the difference that, when it’s uncertain whether or not a
>>> candidate deserves approval, you can give hir partial approval, by an
>>> intermediate point-rating.
>>>
>>> Nice, sometimes convenient, because, otherwise, the only way to give
>>> someone partial approval would be probabilistically.
>>>
>>> But Score loses Approval’s absolute minimalness, & unique
>>> unarbitrariness.
>>>
>>> Much better to let the voters deal with such things for themselves with
>>> the absolutely minimal handtool, than to use some arbitrary & (somewhat or
>>> greatly) complicated definition, rule & count. …with the consequent expense
>>> & count-fraud vulnerability.
>>>
>>> So it is strategically equivalent to Approval while being more
>>>> complicated and less fair.
>>>>
>>> More complicated, yes.
>>>
>>> I strongly oppose a runoff for Approval, but some jurisdictions might
>>> insist on one.
>>>
>>> …likewise Score.
>>>
>>> It’s true that it somewhat increases  Condorcet-efficiency &
>>> Social-Utility (SU), but it brings great strategy-complication, including
>>> the loss of FBC compliance.
>>>
>>> But STAR is better than Hare because:
>>>
>>> It retains some amount Score’s merit.
>>>
>>> It’s much, much simpler than Hare, resulting in much better count-fraud
>>> security.
>>>
>>> It’s much less expensive to administer & implement than Hare.
>>>
>>> It’s much simpler to describe its workings when proposing it.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> And Approval has a quite good reputation here because it meets Favorite
>>>> Betrayal  (aka FBC) and compared with FPP the winner
>>>> will strongly tend to have higher social utility and  be much more
>>>> likely  a sincere Condorcet winner.  Also, and not unrelatedly,
>>>> it has a bias toward centrists that some people think is wonderful.
>>>>
>>>> But some people seem to think that adding a Top-Two Runoff (automated
>>>> in the case of STAR) to Score (to make STAR) is just
>>>> a harmless little gimmick that just makes the method "a bit more
>>>> accurate", brings it into compliance with Condorcet Loser
>>>> and so must make it more "Condorcet efficient".   ("Sky-high" according
>>>> to CLC here).
>>>>
>>>> But actually it makes the method profoundly different and very bad. It
>>>> seems to me that the inventors of STAR must have been
>>>> motivated by three priorities:
>>>>
>>>> (1) the method isn't  Hare,
>>>>
>>>> (2) the method, in a purely technical and completely useless way,
>>>> apparently meets Mono-raise (aka Monotonicity).
>>>>
>>>> (3) subject to being saleable to and understood by  not-so-deep
>>>> thinkers, the method be as bad as possible.
>>>>
>>>> From the "equal-vote" website:    https://www.equal.vote/
>>>>
>>>> Ranked Choice Voting, where voters rank candidates in order of
>>>> preference has been lauded as a solution, but in elections where the third
>>>> candidate is actually competitive, vote-splitting remains a serious
>>>> issue <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yhO6jfHPFQU&t=169s> and RCV
>>>> only offers a marginal improvement compared to a primary and  general
>>>> election with Choose-One Plurality voting.
>>>>
>>>> Luckily, many voting methods are can effectively prevent
>>>> vote-splitting. As it turns out, when voters can weigh in on each candidate
>>>> individually, when all ballot data is counted, and when voters are able to
>>>> show equal preference, vote-splitting can be eliminated. All voting methods
>>>> which do this pass the Equal Vote Criterion
>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion>, including STAR
>>>> Voting <https://www.starvoting.us/star>,...
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The "Equal Vote Criterion" is just  propaganda nonsense:
>>>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equal_Vote_Criterion
>>>>
>>>> The Equal Vote Criterion or Equality Criterion
>>>> <https://www.equal.vote/theequalvote> is a voting method criterion
>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Voting_system_criterion> which requires
>>>> that a voting method ensure that every voter may cast a vote which is as
>>>> powerful as a vote cast by any other voter. Voting methods which pass the
>>>> Equal Vote Criterion do not exhibit vote-splitting
>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Vote-splitting> or the "Spoiler Effect,"
>>>> ensuring that every vote can cast an equally weighted vote
>>>> <https://electowiki.org/wiki/Equally_Weighted_Vote>.
>>>>
>>>> Choose-One Plurality Voting (First Past the Post) and Instant Runoff
>>>> Voting (often referred to as Ranked Choice Voting) do not satisfy the Equal
>>>> Vote Criterion.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This is just dishonest blather. If anything meets this very vague and
>>>> confused "criterion" IRV (aka Hare) certainly does.
>>>>
>>>> The classic scenario that motivated some people get negative about Hare
>>>> (and also methods like Min-Max Margins):
>>>>
>>>> 49 Bush
>>>> 24 Gore
>>>> 27 Nader>Gore
>>>>
>>>> Gore>Bush 51-49,   Bush>Nader 49-27, Nader>Gore 27-24.
>>>>
>>>> Hare eliminates Gore and elects Bush, so the Nader voters whose Gore>
>>>> Bush preference was strong had incentive to use the Compromise
>>>> strategy and vote Gore>Nader ("betraying" their sincere favourite).  If
>>>> the method was Approval they could have approved both Nader and
>>>> Gore, preventing the election of Bush without having to vote their
>>>> sincere favorite below equal-top.
>>>>
>>>> But in this type of scenario STAR does no better than Hare. The Nader
>>>> voters would have incentive to give Nader zero points.
>>>>
>>>> "Traditionally" Hare's  vulnerability to Push-over strategy has said to
>>>> be a result of it's failure of Mono-raise.  But STAR is much more vulnerable
>>>> to Push-over.
>>>>
>>>> Say you are sure that your favourite will make the final two. In that
>>>> case then you have incentive to give every candidate that you are sure your
>>>> favourite can beat 4 or 5 stars.  If 5 stars then you are relying on
>>>> you favourite winning the runoff without your help, but if 4 stars then you
>>>> might
>>>> fail to get one of the predicted sure-loser turkeys into the final.
>>>>
>>>> In a Hare Push-over strategy scenario, the strategists rely on their
>>>> favourite winning the runoff against their own votes, i.e. with their votes
>>>> supporting
>>>> the turkey against their favourite. This makes it much more risky (more
>>>> likely to backfire) and difficult to coordinate than is the case with STAR.
>>>>
>>>> The equal-vote site has a link to a quite ok video on the Favorite
>>>> Betrayal Criterion.  I find that weird and misleading, because STAR badly
>>>> fails FBC.
>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ
>>>>
>>>> From https://www.starvoting.org/
>>>>
>>>> Why STAR Voting?
>>>>
>>>> Voting reform is the keystone. A single cause with the potential to
>>>> empower us to be more effective on every other issue we care about.
>>>>
>>>>    -
>>>>
>>>>    Honesty is the best strategy. Strategic voting is not incentivized.
>>>>    <https://www.starvoting.org/strategic_voting>
>>>>    -
>>>>
>>>>    Even if your favorite can’t win, your vote helps prevent your worst
>>>>    case scenario. <https://www.starvoting.org/how_to_vote>
>>>>    -
>>>>
>>>>    Highly accurate, no matter how many candidates/parties are in the
>>>>    race. <https://www.starvoting.org/accuracy>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure exactly what "accurate" is supposed to mean, but I refute
>>>> the suggestion that these claims are more true of STAR than they are of
>>>> Hare.
>>>>
>>>> In the poll I will vote STAR below Hare and Approval and all the
>>>> Condorcet methods.
>>>>
>>>> Chris
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>>> info
>>>
>> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240411/210e4e23/attachment-0001.htm>