[EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections

[Michael Ossipoff]

Yes, thanks for posting that list-update. My count is 23 also. With so
many, it’s easy to miss one.

Yes, more should be said about the methods.

In fact, doesn’t ranking the methods required a statement, for each one, of
its advantage(s) over other methods? What guarantees or other desirable
properties distinguish each method from the others?

There’s nothing wrong with “electioneering” before an election. In fact,
isn’t it necessary?

I’ve told of some unique advantages of Approval, &  why it’s what I propose
for public political elections.

One thing that I might not have emphasized enough is that, when there are
unacceptable candidates, as I claim there are, the absolutely minimal
Approval has the obvious simple optimal-strategy of approving all of the
Acceptables & none of the Unacceptables.

Compare that to the favorite-burial defensive- strategy of IRV & most
non-wv Condorcet, where (to *fully, maximally* protect Acceptables against
burial) one must try to guess which acceptable compromise(s) to insincerely
rank over Favorite, & in what order… i.e. where to successfully combine
compromise-support with people who agree with you about some of the
Acceptables.

An intractable strategic morass.

By its ultimate minimalness, Approval is unmatched for easy proposal,
implementation (can be zero-cost), administration, & audit against error &
count-fraud.

I emphasize the count-fraud, because it’s easy to forget that it doesn’t
matter how good a method ideally is, if its complicated,
 computation-intensive, un-transparent count facilitates count-fraud.

For polls, & for jurisdictions where rankings are insisted-on, I’ve told
why & how wv Condorcet fully achieves the Condorcet promise—&, in fact,
achieves nothing less than the the ideal for voting-systems: Absence of
need for defensive strategy…allowing uninhibited free sincere expression of
preference-ordering.

On Mon, Apr 8, 2024 at 12:49 Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 2024-04-08 08:57, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > Has anybody submitted Benham's GLE (Gross Loser Elimination)? Another
> > name could be Min Fuss Elimination:
> > Until some candidate is undefeated among those still in play ...
> > eliminate the one showing the fewest losing votes in its worst remaining
> > pairwise contest.
>
> Nope, so I'm guessing that you're nominating it :-) The new list is:
>
> Approval
> RP(wv)
> Schulze
> IRV
> Plurality
> Majority Judgement (as a category; includes usual judgement etc.)
> Approval with manual runoff
> Copeland//Borda (also called Ranked Robin)
> MinMax(wv)
> Black
> STAR
> Smith//Score
> Baldwin
> Benham
> Woodall
> Schwartz-Woodall
> Smith//Approval (implicit - of all ranked)
> Smith//Approval (explicit - specified approval cutoff)
> Margins-Sorted Approval
> Smith//DAC
> Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal-rated whole)
> RCIPE
> Gross Loser Elimination.
>
> If anyone would like to provide short descriptions of one or more of the
> methods, that would be much appreciated. I'll see if I can come up with
> some later, myself.
>
> -km
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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