[EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 2024-04-07 09:39, Richard Lung wrote:
> 
> Some comments about this voting methods poll seem to be in order.
> 
> A referendum on voting methods is paradoxical, because you have to know 
> good method, in order to find it. It's standard scientific method, 
> explained by HG Wells over a century ago, that voting method is not a 
> matter of opinion but a matter of demonstration.

There's something about the way you write that's hard for me to 
understand. For instance, I don't know what you mean by "demonstration" 
here.

But on the general point: I doubt the results will be different between 
Condorcet methods, except perhaps up to ties - some methods will return 
more ties than others. That's why I suggested a method that has a low 
tie rate.
> This opinion poll would access the views of list members but it also 
> shows the disconnect with voters of the world, judging by the list of 
> options, mentioned by Kristofer. The caution by, or attributed to, 
> Werner Heisenberg is worth mentioning again: if you cannot at last come 
> back and explain wat it is you have found, all your finding has been 
> worthless.

We do know what we would find, though: the accumulated opinions of the 
people who participate, about what methods are more suitable than others 
for political use.

> Social choice theory has had 70 years to do this. They held a 50 year 
> celebration, at turn of 2000. Where is their standard model of election 
> method? Or is it an "Impossibility" in their fallible opinion? Their 
> insisting on the Anglo-American single member system is a case of: what 
> is may not be what's right (as David Hume said, and half the world seems 
> not to think so). Single member elections automatically halve 
> representation, its most inefficient form: "only half a democracy" 
> (Roert Newland). Compared to that, all the tweaks to single member 
> systems are insignificant, and not calculated to promote democratic 
> reform or progress. Only a Dr Pangloss would suggest this is the best of 
> all possible democratic worlds.

There are so many methods because yes, there is an impossibility. We 
can't have every desirable criterion at once, so we have to choose. Namely:

Arrow's says that there exists no ranked single-winner method (apart 
from certain random exceptions not listed here) that can't be made to 
change its mind by removing candidates who didn't win.

Gibbard says that you can't be strategy-proof: whatever your method, it 
will sometimes pay to vote tactically.

Duggan-Schwartz says that the impossibility of being strategy-proof 
remains *even for multi-winner*, unless you elect every candidate who is 
someone's first preference.

I would hardly dismiss them.

I wouldn't say single-member district is the best of all possible 
worlds. I might even say that better democracy reduces the use of 
elections, by using selection by lot combined with deliberation instead. 
But for the situations where you have to use single-winner, it's a good 
idea to know what to use. Or to have a selection of good methods to 
choose from.

-km