[EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections

[Ted Stern]

I'd like to nominate

Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole).

On Sat, Apr 6, 2024, 12:27 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 06:43 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>
>> Michael,
>>
>> Why do you think that  STAR is better than IRV (aka Hare) ?
>>
> As you know, I’ve been a lot more favorable to Hare than most. But:
>
> 1. I’ve realized that the choices, sometimes strategic, that Approval puts
> on the voter are a lot better than the count-complexity &
> computation-intensiveness—& consequent count-insecurity & count-fraud
> vulnerability of the ranked methods such as Condorcet & Hare.
>
> That count-fraud problem is the worst, but, overall, Approval is much
> easier to introduce, describe, explain, propose—& much easier & inexpensive
> to implement (can be implemented at zero cost, without even
> software-modification), administer & audit against error &
> count-fraud…compared to any other multicandidate-suitable method.
>  …especially the ranked-methods.
>
> I’d much rather trust voters to use Approval well than trust that the
> count/m-staff won’t be bribed to do fraud.
>
> Approval is the absolutely minimal method that allows & counts
> multicandidate comparison…& therefore the unique completely unarbitrary
> method.
>
> Score & STAR? They have a strategy-problem that Approval doesn’t have,
> when some people vote sincerely (merit-proportionate) & others vote
> strategically (all-or-nothing).
>
> But I nonetheless would rather have that than the problems of the
> rank-methods.
>
> Likewise, Score & STAR are less simple than the absolutely minimal
> Approval, & so I much prefer Approval.  …but Score & STAR don’t even come
> close to the computational complexity of Condorcet & Hare.
>
> I prefer Score(0-5) to STAR because of the strategy-complications &
> problems of the runoff, & the resulting FBC failure that you pointed out.
> But, for public political elections, STAR still beats Condorcet & Hare, due
> to their count-complexity.
>
> 2. Hare, while sharing the count-complexity of Condorcet (& additionally
> requiring either one big central count, or lots of back-&-forth information
> transfer between precincts & Central) doesn’t share Condorcet’s
> strategy-freeness…requiring a favorite-burying top-end defensive-strategy
> to protect acceptables from unacceptables.  …with the risk that timid
> lesser-evil voters will do the same to protect their lesser evil.
>
> Sure, Hare elects the favorite of the largest faction of the
> mutual-majority when there is one,  but the support isn’t always mutual.
>
> You can hope that, with Compromise as your 2nd-choice, if Favorite
> eliminates Compromise, Compromise’s voters will transfer to Favorite
> because they’re both progressives.  But, for one thing, if Compromise’s
> voters transfer the other way, an unacceptable could be elected. That’s too
> big a chance to take when there are completely unacceptable candidates.
>
> For another thing, if they transfer to a perceived progressive, it might
> not be Favorite, & might not even be very (or at-all) progressive.
>
> I used to think that Hare was alright for polls, but Hare can have its
> problem & do a funny trick, do a Silly, even in a poll. It demonstrated
> that in a Free-&-Equal poll.
>
> But I like Hare for choosing a pizza 🍕 topping or a 🍿 etc.
>
> Easy handcount too.
>
> I prefer Condorcet, especially RP(wv), for polls, & to propose to
> jurisdictions where people insist on rankings. But not for public political
> elections, for the abovestated reasons.
>
>
>
>
>>
>> And surely anyone here on this list can nominate any method they choose
>> (and have it accepted/acknowledged) regardless of whether or not the
>> method's supporters want it nominated.
>>
>>
>>
>> Chris Benham
>>
>>
>> On 6/04/2024 10:46 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>>
>> This is to acknowledge the nominations of Smith//Default-Approval,
>> Smith//Explicit-Approval, Margins-Sorted Approval, & Smith//DAC.
>>
>> I’d say include STAR, because that’s what its advocates would want.  …or
>> would they? Its enactment is going to be voted-on in Eugene next month, &
>> what if it finishes low here? That would be worse for the Eugene initiative
>> than not including it.
>>
>> Of course showing voters about methods’ popularity here is my
>> stated-purpose for the poll, & the fact that it’s about to be voted on for
>> enactment would seem to suggest including it.
>>
>> But the advocates of STAR have been working hard, completely in good
>> faith, & STAR is a lot better than IRV. Those are two good reasons to let
>> EqualVote decide on STAR’s inclusion in the poll.
>>
>> I’ll ask the EqualVote group, & go by what they say.
>>
>> (In fact STAR, while more complicated than Approval, has nothing like the
>> amount of count-complexity of Condorcet, or the consequent amount of
>> count-insecurity & count-fraud vulnerability. I personally don’t propose
>> STAR, because I regard it as an inbetween compromise between Approval & the
>> ranked-methods, & I want the absolutely minimal. (I only propose Condorcet
>> to jurisdictions where people insist on rankings.) …but, by my
>> simplicity-standard, STAR scores high, even though I don’t propose it.)
>>
>> So the nominations list so-far is now (listed in order of nomination):
>>
>> Approval
>> RP(wv)
>> Schulze
>> IRV
>> Plurality
>> MinMax(wv)
>> Black
>> Baldwin
>> Benham
>> Woodall
>> Schwartz-Woodall
>> Smith//Approval (of all ranked)
>> Smith//Approval (of what is specified)
>> Margin-Sorted Approval
>> Smith//DAC
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 04:03 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I would like to nominate several methods.
>>>
>>> Smith//Approval (Ranking):
>>>
>>> Voters rank from the top only those candidates they "approve",
>>> equal-ranking allowed,
>>> the most approved member of the voted Smith set wins.
>>>
>>> Smith//Approval (specified cutoff):
>>>
>>> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can also
>>> specify an approval
>>> cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below
>>> no others (i.e. ranked top
>>> or equal-top).
>>> The most approved member of the Smith set wins.
>>>
>>> Margins Sorted Approval (specified cutoff):
>>>
>>> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can also
>>> specify an approval
>>> cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below
>>> no others (i.e. ranked top
>>> or equal-top).
>>>
>>> A Forrest Simmons invention. Candidates are listed in approval score
>>> order and if any adjacent pairs
>>> are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by flipping the
>>> out-of-order pair with the smallest
>>> margin. If there is a tie for this we flip the less approved pair.
>>> Repeat until there are no adjacent pairs
>>> of candidates that are pairwise out of order, then elect the
>>> highest-ordered candidate.
>>>
>>> Smith//:DAC
>>>
>>> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish,
>>> equal-ranking allowed.
>>> Eliminate candidates not in the Smith set and then apply
>>> Woodall's Descending Acquiescing Coalitions method.
>>>
>>> There is a method I hate that is apparently contending in the real
>>> world: "STAR". Given the stated purpose of
>>> this poll, is there a case for including it?
>>>
>>> Chris Benham
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Michael Ossipoff* email9648742 at gmail.com
>>> <election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAOKDY5BkSGJkX%3D7zWXBr2t1SBNVMNj96wm-T8ubvr_wGM5h51w%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
>>> *Wed Apr 3 22:13:28 PDT 2024*
>>>
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> EM used to do a lot of polls, but now never does. So I wouldn’t propose
>>> one, if it weren’t for the fact that, this year, the voters of at least two
>>> states are going to vote on whether to enact a certain voting-system.
>>>
>>> It seems to me—tell me if I’m wrong—that those people have a right to know
>>> how people familiar with voting-systems feel about the relative merits of
>>> some voting-systems.
>>>
>>> So, though I claim that polls are valuable for demonstrating the experience
>>> of using the voting systems, & how they work, & what they’ll do—& are
>>> therefore useful & worthwhile for their own sake—this poll that I now
>>> propose isn’t a poll for its own sake.
>>>
>>> It is, as I said, proposed for the important practical purpose of letting
>>> the voters in the upcoming enactment-elections know how we feel about the
>>> relative merits of some voting-systems, including the one that they’re
>>> about to vote on the enactment of.
>>>
>>> The voting-method for the poll:
>>>
>>> It seems to me that Schulze is the most popular ranked voting-system, among
>>> the people at EM.
>>>
>>> …& it seems to me that the last time we voted on EM’s collective favorite
>>> voting-system, Approval won.
>>>
>>> Those seem the top-two, in EM popularity.
>>>
>>>
>>>
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