<div dir="auto">I'd like to nominate<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole).</div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Apr 6, 2024, 12:27 Michael Ossipoff <<a href="mailto:email9648742@gmail.com">email9648742@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><br></div><div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 06:43 Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><u></u>
<div>
<p>Michael,<br>
<br>
Why do you think that STAR is better than IRV (aka Hare) ?</p></div></blockquote><div dir="auto">As you know, I’ve been a lot more favorable to Hare than most. But:</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">1. I’ve realized that the choices, sometimes strategic, that Approval puts on the voter are a lot better than the count-complexity & computation-intensiveness—& consequent count-insecurity & count-fraud vulnerability of the ranked methods such as Condorcet & Hare.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">That count-fraud problem is the worst, but, overall, Approval is much easier to introduce, describe, explain, propose—& much easier & inexpensive to implement (can be implemented at zero cost, without even software-modification), administer & audit against error & count-fraud…compared to any other multicandidate-suitable method. …especially the ranked-methods.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I’d much rather trust voters to use Approval well than trust that the count/m-staff won’t be bribed to do fraud.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Approval is the absolutely minimal method that allows & counts multicandidate comparison…& therefore the unique completely unarbitrary method.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Score & STAR? They have a strategy-problem that Approval doesn’t have, when some people vote sincerely (merit-proportionate) & others vote strategically (all-or-nothing).<br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But I nonetheless would rather have that than the problems of the rank-methods. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Likewise, Score & STAR are less simple than the absolutely minimal Approval, & so I much prefer Approval. …but Score & STAR don’t even come close to the computational complexity of Condorcet & Hare.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I prefer Score(0-5) to STAR because of the strategy-complications & problems of the runoff, & the resulting FBC failure that you pointed out. But, for public political elections, STAR still beats Condorcet & Hare, due to their count-complexity.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">2. Hare, while sharing the count-complexity of Condorcet (& additionally requiring either one big central count, or lots of back-&-forth information transfer between precincts & Central) doesn’t share Condorcet’s strategy-freeness…requiring a favorite-burying top-end defensive-strategy to protect acceptables from unacceptables. …with the risk that timid lesser-evil voters will do the same to protect their lesser evil.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Sure, Hare elects the favorite of the largest faction of the mutual-majority when there is one, but the support isn’t always mutual.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">You can hope that, with Compromise as your 2nd-choice, if Favorite eliminates Compromise, Compromise’s voters will transfer to Favorite because they’re both progressives. But, for one thing, if Compromise’s voters transfer the other way, an unacceptable could be elected. That’s too big a chance to take when there are completely unacceptable candidates.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">For another thing, if they transfer to a perceived progressive, it might not be Favorite, & might not even be very (or at-all) progressive.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I used to think that Hare was alright for polls, but Hare can have its problem & do a funny trick, do a Silly, even in a poll. It demonstrated that in a Free-&-Equal poll.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But I like Hare for choosing a pizza 🍕 topping or a 🍿 etc. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Easy handcount too.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I prefer Condorcet, especially RP(wv), for polls, & to propose to jurisdictions where people insist on rankings. But not for public political elections, for the abovestated reasons.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><p dir="auto"><br>
<br>
And surely anyone here on this list can nominate any method they
choose (and have it accepted/acknowledged) regardless of whether
or not the method's supporters want it nominated.</p></div><div><p><br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
<div>On 6/04/2024 10:46 pm, Michael Ossipoff
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">This is to acknowledge the nominations of
Smith//Default-Approval, Smith//Explicit-Approval,
Margins-Sorted Approval, & Smith//DAC.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I’d say include STAR, because that’s what its
advocates would want. …or would they? Its enactment is going to
be voted-on in Eugene next month, & what if it finishes low
here? That would be worse for the Eugene initiative than not
including it.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Of course showing voters about methods’ popularity
here is my stated-purpose for the poll, & the fact that it’s
about to be voted on for enactment would seem to suggest
including it. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But the advocates of STAR have been working hard,
completely in good faith, & STAR is a lot better than IRV.
Those are two good reasons to let EqualVote decide on STAR’s
inclusion in the poll.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">I’ll ask the EqualVote group, & go by what
they say.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">(In fact STAR, while more complicated than
Approval, has nothing like the amount of count-complexity of
Condorcet, or the consequent amount of count-insecurity &
count-fraud vulnerability. I personally don’t propose STAR,
because I regard it as an inbetween compromise between Approval
& the ranked-methods, & I want the absolutely minimal.
(I only propose Condorcet to jurisdictions where people insist
on rankings.) …but, by my simplicity-standard, STAR scores high,
even though I don’t propose it.)</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">So the nominations list so-far is now (listed in
order of nomination):</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Approval</div>
<div dir="auto">RP(wv)</div>
<div dir="auto">Schulze</div>
<div dir="auto">IRV</div>
<div dir="auto">Plurality</div>
<div dir="auto">MinMax(wv)</div>
<div dir="auto">Black</div>
<div dir="auto">Baldwin </div>
<div dir="auto">Benham</div>
<div dir="auto">Woodall</div>
<div dir="auto">Schwartz-Woodall</div>
<div dir="auto">Smith//Approval (of all ranked)</div>
<div dir="auto">Smith//Approval (of what is specified)</div>
<div dir="auto">Margin-Sorted Approval</div>
<div dir="auto">Smith//DAC</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 04:03
Chris Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">cbenhamau@yahoo.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204)">
<div>
<p><br>
I would like to nominate several methods.<br>
<br>
Smith//Approval (Ranking):<br>
<br>
Voters rank from the top only those candidates they
"approve", equal-ranking allowed,<br>
the most approved member of the voted Smith set wins.<br>
<br>
Smith//Approval (specified cutoff):<br>
<br>
Voters rank from the top however many candidates they
wish and can also specify an approval<br>
cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for
candidates ranked below no others (i.e. ranked top<br>
or equal-top).<br>
The most approved member of the Smith set wins.<br>
<br>
Margins Sorted Approval (specified cutoff):<br>
<br>
Voters rank from the top however many candidates they
wish and can also specify an approval<br>
cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for
candidates ranked below no others (i.e. ranked top<br>
or equal-top).<br>
<br>
A Forrest Simmons invention. Candidates are listed in
approval score order and if any adjacent pairs<br>
are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by
flipping the out-of-order pair with the smallest<br>
margin. If there is a tie for this we flip the less
approved pair. Repeat until there are no adjacent pairs<br>
of candidates that are pairwise out of order, then elect
the highest-ordered candidate.<br>
<br>
Smith//:DAC<br>
<br>
Voters rank from the top however many candidates they
wish, equal-ranking allowed.<br>
Eliminate candidates not in the Smith set and then apply
Woodall's Descending Acquiescing Coalitions method.<br>
<br>
There is a method I hate that is apparently contending
in the real world: "STAR". Given the stated purpose of <br>
this poll, is there a case for including it?<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"><b style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;color:rgb(0,0,0)">Michael
Ossipoff</b><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)"><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman""> </span></span><a href="mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAOKDY5BkSGJkX%3D7zWXBr2t1SBNVMNj96wm-T8ubvr_wGM5h51w%40mail.gmail.com%3E" title="[EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections" style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">email9648742 at
gmail.com</a><br style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">
<i style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;color:rgb(0,0,0)">Wed
Apr 3 22:13:28 PDT 2024</i><span style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;float:none;display:inline!important;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);color:rgb(0,0,0)"></span>
<p style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;color:rgb(0,0,0)"><br>
</p>
<hr style="font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;color:rgb(0,0,0)">
<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;font-family:monospace;color:rgb(0,0,0)">EM used to do a lot of polls, but now never does. So I wouldn’t propose
one, if it weren’t for the fact that, this year, the voters of at least two
states are going to vote on whether to enact a certain voting-system.
It seems to me—tell me if I’m wrong—that those people have a right to know
how people familiar with voting-systems feel about the relative merits of
some voting-systems.
So, though I claim that polls are valuable for demonstrating the experience
of using the voting systems, & how they work, & what they’ll do—& are
therefore useful & worthwhile for their own sake—this poll that I now
propose isn’t a poll for its own sake.
It is, as I said, proposed for the important practical purpose of letting
the voters in the upcoming enactment-elections know how we feel about the
relative merits of some voting-systems, including the one that they’re
about to vote on the enactment of.
The voting-method for the poll:
It seems to me that Schulze is the most popular ranked voting-system, among
the people at EM.
…& it seems to me that the last time we voted on EM’s collective favorite
voting-system, Approval won.
Those seem the top-two, in EM popularity.</pre>
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