[EM] Poll on voting-systems, to inform voters in upcoming enactment-elections

Sat Apr 6 13:12:10 PDT 2024

Nomination of Margin-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal-rated whole)is
acknowledged.

The nominations-list so-far, listed in order of nomination, is:

Approval
RP(wv)
Schulze
IRV
Plurality
MinMax(wv)
Black
Baldwin
Benham
Woodall
Schwartz-Woodall
Smith//Approval (of all ranked)
Smith//Approval (of specified)
Margins-Sorted Approval
Smith//DAC
Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal-rated whole)
STAR, if desired

On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 12:33 Ted Stern <dodecatheon at gmail.com> wrote:

> I'd like to nominate
>
> Margin Sorted Minimum Losing Votes (equal rated whole).
>
> On Sat, Apr 6, 2024, 12:27 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 06:43 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> Michael,
>>>
>>> Why do you think that  STAR is better than IRV (aka Hare) ?
>>>
>> As you know, I’ve been a lot more favorable to Hare than most. But:
>>
>> 1. I’ve realized that the choices, sometimes strategic, that Approval
>> puts on the voter are a lot better than the count-complexity &
>> computation-intensiveness—& consequent count-insecurity & count-fraud
>> vulnerability of the ranked methods such as Condorcet & Hare.
>>
>> That count-fraud problem is the worst, but, overall, Approval is much
>> easier to introduce, describe, explain, propose—& much easier & inexpensive
>> to implement (can be implemented at zero cost, without even
>> software-modification), administer & audit against error &
>> count-fraud…compared to any other multicandidate-suitable method.
>>  …especially the ranked-methods.
>>
>> I’d much rather trust voters to use Approval well than trust that the
>> count/m-staff won’t be bribed to do fraud.
>>
>> Approval is the absolutely minimal method that allows & counts
>> multicandidate comparison…& therefore the unique completely unarbitrary
>> method.
>>
>> Score & STAR? They have a strategy-problem that Approval doesn’t have,
>> when some people vote sincerely (merit-proportionate) & others vote
>> strategically (all-or-nothing).
>>
>> But I nonetheless would rather have that than the problems of the
>> rank-methods.
>>
>> Likewise, Score & STAR are less simple than the absolutely minimal
>> Approval, & so I much prefer Approval.  …but Score & STAR don’t even come
>> close to the computational complexity of Condorcet & Hare.
>>
>> I prefer Score(0-5) to STAR because of the strategy-complications &
>> problems of the runoff, & the resulting FBC failure that you pointed out.
>> But, for public political elections, STAR still beats Condorcet & Hare, due
>> to their count-complexity.
>>
>> 2. Hare, while sharing the count-complexity of Condorcet (& additionally
>> requiring either one big central count, or lots of back-&-forth information
>> transfer between precincts & Central) doesn’t share Condorcet’s
>> strategy-freeness…requiring a favorite-burying top-end defensive-strategy
>> to protect acceptables from unacceptables.  …with the risk that timid
>> lesser-evil voters will do the same to protect their lesser evil.
>>
>> Sure, Hare elects the favorite of the largest faction of the
>> mutual-majority when there is one,  but the support isn’t always mutual.
>>
>> You can hope that, with Compromise as your 2nd-choice, if Favorite
>> eliminates Compromise, Compromise’s voters will transfer to Favorite
>> because they’re both progressives.  But, for one thing, if Compromise’s
>> voters transfer the other way, an unacceptable could be elected. That’s too
>> big a chance to take when there are completely unacceptable candidates.
>>
>> For another thing, if they transfer to a perceived progressive, it might
>> not be Favorite, & might not even be very (or at-all) progressive.
>>
>> I used to think that Hare was alright for polls, but Hare can have its
>> problem & do a funny trick, do a Silly, even in a poll. It demonstrated
>> that in a Free-&-Equal poll.
>>
>> But I like Hare for choosing a pizza 🍕 topping or a 🍿 etc.
>>
>> Easy handcount too.
>>
>> I prefer Condorcet, especially RP(wv), for polls, & to propose to
>> jurisdictions where people insist on rankings. But not for public political
>> elections, for the abovestated reasons.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> And surely anyone here on this list can nominate any method they choose
>>> (and have it accepted/acknowledged) regardless of whether or not the
>>> method's supporters want it nominated.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Chris Benham
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/04/2024 10:46 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> This is to acknowledge the nominations of Smith//Default-Approval,
>>> Smith//Explicit-Approval, Margins-Sorted Approval, & Smith//DAC.
>>>
>>> I’d say include STAR, because that’s what its advocates would want.  …or
>>> would they? Its enactment is going to be voted-on in Eugene next month, &
>>> what if it finishes low here? That would be worse for the Eugene initiative
>>> than not including it.
>>>
>>> Of course showing voters about methods’ popularity here is my
>>> stated-purpose for the poll, & the fact that it’s about to be voted on for
>>> enactment would seem to suggest including it.
>>>
>>> But the advocates of STAR have been working hard, completely in good
>>> faith, & STAR is a lot better than IRV. Those are two good reasons to let
>>> EqualVote decide on STAR’s inclusion in the poll.
>>>
>>> I’ll ask the EqualVote group, & go by what they say.
>>>
>>> (In fact STAR, while more complicated than Approval, has nothing like
>>> the amount of count-complexity of Condorcet, or the consequent amount of
>>> count-insecurity & count-fraud vulnerability. I personally don’t propose
>>> STAR, because I regard it as an inbetween compromise between Approval & the
>>> ranked-methods, & I want the absolutely minimal. (I only propose Condorcet
>>> to jurisdictions where people insist on rankings.) …but, by my
>>> simplicity-standard, STAR scores high, even though I don’t propose it.)
>>>
>>> So the nominations list so-far is now (listed in order of nomination):
>>>
>>> Approval
>>> RP(wv)
>>> Schulze
>>> IRV
>>> Plurality
>>> MinMax(wv)
>>> Black
>>> Baldwin
>>> Benham
>>> Woodall
>>> Schwartz-Woodall
>>> Smith//Approval (of all ranked)
>>> Smith//Approval (of what is specified)
>>> Margin-Sorted Approval
>>> Smith//DAC
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sat, Apr 6, 2024 at 04:03 Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I would like to nominate several methods.
>>>>
>>>> Smith//Approval (Ranking):
>>>>
>>>> Voters rank from the top only those candidates they "approve",
>>>> equal-ranking allowed,
>>>> the most approved member of the voted Smith set wins.
>>>>
>>>> Smith//Approval (specified cutoff):
>>>>
>>>> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can also
>>>> specify an approval
>>>> cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below
>>>> no others (i.e. ranked top
>>>> or equal-top).
>>>> The most approved member of the Smith set wins.
>>>>
>>>> Margins Sorted Approval (specified cutoff):
>>>>
>>>> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish and can also
>>>> specify an approval
>>>> cutoff/threshold. Default approval is only for candidates ranked below
>>>> no others (i.e. ranked top
>>>> or equal-top).
>>>>
>>>> A Forrest Simmons invention. Candidates are listed in approval score
>>>> order and if any adjacent pairs
>>>> are pairwise out of order then this is corrected by flipping the
>>>> out-of-order pair with the smallest
>>>> margin. If there is a tie for this we flip the less approved pair.
>>>> Repeat until there are no adjacent pairs
>>>> of candidates that are pairwise out of order, then elect the
>>>> highest-ordered candidate.
>>>>
>>>> Smith//:DAC
>>>>
>>>> Voters rank from the top however many candidates they wish,
>>>> equal-ranking allowed.
>>>> Eliminate candidates not in the Smith set and then apply
>>>> Woodall's Descending Acquiescing Coalitions method.
>>>>
>>>> There is a method I hate that is apparently contending in the real
>>>> world: "STAR". Given the stated purpose of
>>>> this poll, is there a case for including it?
>>>>
>>>> Chris Benham
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *Michael Ossipoff* email9648742 at gmail.com
>>>> <election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Poll%20on%20voting-systems%2C%0A%20to%20inform%20voters%20in%20upcoming%20enactment-elections&In-Reply-To=%3CCAOKDY5BkSGJkX%3D7zWXBr2t1SBNVMNj96wm-T8ubvr_wGM5h51w%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
>>>> *Wed Apr 3 22:13:28 PDT 2024*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> EM used to do a lot of polls, but now never does. So I wouldn’t propose
>>>> one, if it weren’t for the fact that, this year, the voters of at least two
>>>> states are going to vote on whether to enact a certain voting-system.
>>>>
>>>> It seems to me—tell me if I’m wrong—that those people have a right to know
>>>> how people familiar with voting-systems feel about the relative merits of
>>>> some voting-systems.
>>>>
>>>> So, though I claim that polls are valuable for demonstrating the experience
>>>> of using the voting systems, & how they work, & what they’ll do—& are
>>>> therefore useful & worthwhile for their own sake—this poll that I now
>>>> propose isn’t a poll for its own sake.
>>>>
>>>> It is, as I said, proposed for the important practical purpose of letting
>>>> the voters in the upcoming enactment-elections know how we feel about the
>>>> relative merits of some voting-systems, including the one that they’re
>>>> about to vote on the enactment of.
>>>>
>>>> The voting-method for the poll:
>>>>
>>>> It seems to me that Schulze is the most popular ranked voting-system, among
>>>> the people at EM.
>>>>
>>>> …& it seems to me that the last time we voted on EM’s collective favorite
>>>> voting-system, Approval won.
>>>>
>>>> Those seem the top-two, in EM popularity.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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