[EM] Fwd: Is autodeterrence bad? (+STAR fails hyperchicken catastrophically)

[Michael Ossipoff]

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 13:21
Subject: Re: [EM] Is autodeterrence bad? (+STAR fails hyperchicken
catastrophically)
To: Closed Limelike Curves <closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com>


I meant the Voting Theory Forum.

On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 13:13 Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> That post is thoroughly bizarre:
>
> Autodeterence is defined as a property for Condorcet methods, & Closed
> thinks he’s somehow discrediting it by telling about a STAR situation.
>
> We’re getting leakage & spillover from the Voting Science Forum.
>
> On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 11:09 Closed Limelike Curves <
> closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I think the EM mailing list made a wrong turn a while back in
>> misunderstanding "autodeterrence" as a positive attribute of a voting
>> system, which discourages burial. I'd like to put forth an argument (which
>> I'm still somewhat hesitant about) that it's a very *bad* property.
>> Given the chance, political machines are likely to reach out and grab this
>> third rail as hard as they can, even if it's terrible for their
>> constituents, because it maximizes their chances of election.
>>
>> Start with a 2.5-candidate race between Gore, Bush, and a Nazi (who has a
>> small, but slightly above zero, level of support). Gore doesn't know
>> whether he or Bush is more popular in a runoff, but he's certain he and
>> Bush will make it to the runoff with honest voting. However, he realizes he
>> can use the Nazi as a bludgeon to increase his chances of winning. He tells
>> his supporters to cast votes as follows:
>> Gore – 5/5
>> Bush – 0/5
>> Nazi – 4/5
>>
>> Gore's hope is that the Nazi is polarizing enough to defeat Bush for
>> second place with Gore's support (at which point he's a weak candidate in
>> the runoff). Risky? Yes. But it's still plausibly strategic if you think
>> Bush will back down.
>>
>> But if Bush's faction thinks the same thing, the Nazi ends up winning.
>>
>> STAR punishes burial by blowing up the country, creating an extremely
>> high-stakes game of chicken (hyperchicken?). This game has a mixed Nash
>> equilibrium that involves blowing up the country with some small (but
>> positive) probability. The issue isn't that burial is incentivized; it's
>> that it *can* work, but when it fails, it's so strongly *dis*incentivized
>> that it can be catastrophic.
>>
>> This can be especially bad since incentives are even stronger for
>> candidates and campaigns. Campaigns coordinate strategy; voters take cues
>> from campaigns and political elites (which is why the two major-party
>> nominees are always the top-2 winners).
>>
>> The strategy above would be bad for society, and ambiguous for individual
>> voters (it could elect either Gore or a Nazi). On the other hand, *great* for
>> Gore's probability of winning, if Gore
>>
>> Empirically, this kind of turkey-raising happens all the time. Adam
>> Schiff spent millions trying to boost the Republican in California over
>> Katie Porter. The DNC keeps intervening in Republican primaries to help
>> nominate extremists. They keep doing this because they think it's good for
>> their own personal chances of winning the election, not because they think
>> it's good for the country overall. And generally, they're right—even though
>> it risks electing Nazis, it probably helps Democrats win a few more seats.
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20240403/6d26cff8/attachment.htm>