[EM] Is autodeterrence bad? (+STAR fails hyperchicken catastrophically)

[Michael Ossipoff]

That post is thoroughly bizarre:

Autodeterence is defined as a property for Condorcet methods, & Closed
thinks he’s somehow discrediting it by telling about a STAR situation.

We’re getting leakage & spillover from the Voting Science Forum.

On Wed, Apr 3, 2024 at 11:09 Closed Limelike Curves <
closed.limelike.curves at gmail.com> wrote:

> I think the EM mailing list made a wrong turn a while back in
> misunderstanding "autodeterrence" as a positive attribute of a voting
> system, which discourages burial. I'd like to put forth an argument (which
> I'm still somewhat hesitant about) that it's a very *bad* property. Given
> the chance, political machines are likely to reach out and grab this third
> rail as hard as they can, even if it's terrible for their constituents,
> because it maximizes their chances of election.
>
> Start with a 2.5-candidate race between Gore, Bush, and a Nazi (who has a
> small, but slightly above zero, level of support). Gore doesn't know
> whether he or Bush is more popular in a runoff, but he's certain he and
> Bush will make it to the runoff with honest voting. However, he realizes he
> can use the Nazi as a bludgeon to increase his chances of winning. He tells
> his supporters to cast votes as follows:
> Gore – 5/5
> Bush – 0/5
> Nazi – 4/5
>
> Gore's hope is that the Nazi is polarizing enough to defeat Bush for
> second place with Gore's support (at which point he's a weak candidate in
> the runoff). Risky? Yes. But it's still plausibly strategic if you think
> Bush will back down.
>
> But if Bush's faction thinks the same thing, the Nazi ends up winning.
>
> STAR punishes burial by blowing up the country, creating an extremely
> high-stakes game of chicken (hyperchicken?). This game has a mixed Nash
> equilibrium that involves blowing up the country with some small (but
> positive) probability. The issue isn't that burial is incentivized; it's
> that it *can* work, but when it fails, it's so strongly *dis*incentivized
> that it can be catastrophic.
>
> This can be especially bad since incentives are even stronger for
> candidates and campaigns. Campaigns coordinate strategy; voters take cues
> from campaigns and political elites (which is why the two major-party
> nominees are always the top-2 winners).
>
> The strategy above would be bad for society, and ambiguous for individual
> voters (it could elect either Gore or a Nazi). On the other hand, *great* for
> Gore's probability of winning, if Gore
>
> Empirically, this kind of turkey-raising happens all the time. Adam Schiff
> spent millions trying to boost the Republican in California over Katie
> Porter. The DNC keeps intervening in Republican primaries to help nominate
> extremists. They keep doing this because they think it's good for their own
> personal chances of winning the election, not because they think it's good
> for the country overall. And generally, they're right—even though it risks
> electing Nazis, it probably helps Democrats win a few more seats.
> ----
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>
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