[EM] Reply to Rob regarding RCV

[Michael Ossipoff]

Benjamin is vulnerable to an offensive strategy:

Say my faction is fairly sure that our favorite will have a higher
top-count than the CW. So we look around for a candidate against whom we
probably have a pairwise win. We use ord-reversal to make him pair-beat the
CW. Now we  have a circular tie in which Benjamin will eliminate, before
ours, the candidate who pair-beats ours.



On Sat, Sep 23, 2023 at 14:52 Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>
wrote:

>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 23, 2023, 11:19 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Hi Rob—
>>
>> …
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> …
>>
>> [quote]
>>
>> Oh Michael...where do I begin?  Your apparent move to the dark side makes
>> me sad.  I realize that this intro may sound condescending, but I truly
>> don't mean it that way.  I deeply respect your opinion. YOU were the one
>> who taught me about "center squeeze" in 1995 or so, and made me rethink
>> AV/PV/IRV/RCV (or whatever the name of the week is).
>>
>> [/quote]
>>
>> …
>>
>> Yes, earlier I was quite critical of RCV (called IRV in those days,
>> before San Francisco insisted on RCV, because “instant” was misleading
>> people to expect an instantaneous count).
>>
>> …
>>
>> I was wrong.
>>
>> …
>>
>> You know that often the relative merits, advantages & disadvantages of
>> single-winner methods aren’t what they at first seem. Never be prematurely
>> sure that someone is wrong about such matters.
>>
>> …
>>
>> But I would like to remind you that I also continue to say that
>> Condorcet, in its best versions, is my favorite, because, always electing
>> the CW, it best gets rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem (LO2E) for any &
>> every  kind of voter, thereby accommodating even the most timid LO2E
>> giveaway voter.
>>
>> …
>>
>> As I said, RCV only works & has merit if the voters aren’t timid
>> overcomromising LO2E giveaway voters.
>>
>> …
>>
>> I don’t deny that Condorcet-failure is a disadvantage, but, with a good
>> electorate, it doesn’t matter. I used to say that Approval’s equal-givaway,
>> amounting to an abstention between Favorite & Lesser-Evil, is better than
>> RCV’s favorite-burial…but not if you have an electorate that won’t do the
>> burial !!!
>>
>> …
>>
>> Approval & STAR encourage Mr. Timid to do giveaway. RCV encourages
>> everyone to be frank, honest, ambitious, hopeful !!!
>>
>> …
>>
>> …because, as I said, that won’t be a problem, because an electorate that
>> has enacted RCV didn’t do so because they want & intend to vote a
>> hold-you-nose lesser-evil over their favorite (They can & do do that now,
>> in Plurality). If they enact RCV it’s because they want & intend to
>> sincerely rank the candidates, expressing & fully-supporting their favorite.
>>
>>
>> …
>>
>> …& so THEY WILL DO SO !!!
>>
>> …
>>
>> So don’t worry about LO2E strategy in RCV voting.
>>
>> …
>>
>> Anti-RCVists often say that RCV doesn’t really honor majority.
>>
>> …
>>
>> But, as I’ve been saying, though RCV doesn’t meet the Condorcet
>> Criterion, it meets the Mutual-Majority Criterion (MMC).  Let me state
>> an improved & expanded definition of MMC:
>>
>> …
>>
>> MMC:
>>
>> …
>>
>> If there are 1 or more sets of candidates such that a majority of the
>> voters prefer the candidates of that set to everyone outside the set, then
>> the winner should come from such a set.
>>
>> …
>>
>> (Then it goes without saying that, when there’s a Mutual-Majority
>> (defined below) the winner will come from that Mutual-Majority.)
>>
>> …
>>
>>  [end of MMC definition]
>>
>> …
>>
>> A majority who all prefer some set of candidates to everyone outside that
>> set, I call an Agreeing-Majority.
>>
>> …
>>
>> A majority who all prefer *the same* set of candidates to everyone
>> outside that set, I call a  Mutual-Majority.
>>
>> …
>>
>> (Arguably a weaker definition of a Mutual-Majority would do: A majority
>> who all prefer all of their favorites to everyone outside the set of all
>> their favorites.)
>>
>> …
>>
>> When there are 1 or more Agreeing-Majorities, RCV always elects the
>> candidate of the largest faction of  an Agreeing-Majority.
>>
>> …
>>
>> i.e. under those conditions, RCV always elects the favorite of an
>> Agreeing-Majority.
>>
>> …
>>
>> RCV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of the
>> Mutual-Majority.
>>
>> …
>>
>> i.e. RCV always elects the favorite of the Mutual-Majority.
>>
>> …
>>
>> That candidate isn’t an unpopular extremist, but instead has strong
>> genuine majority coalition support, as defined above.
>>
>> …
>>
>> [quote]
>>
>> I just think you're incorrect about FairVote.
>>
>> [/quote]
>>
>> …
>>
>> I didn’t say anything about FairVote.
>>
>> …
>>
>> Whether you like FairVote or not, that has no bearing on the merits of
>> RCV.
>>
>> …
>>
>> FairVote, from the start, has insisted on offering the traditional RCV.  We
>> should respect that choice. RCV has about a century of precedent in
>> Australia & Ireland. Proposing a traditional method with long precedent is
>> a valid practical choice, & one that we should respect.
>>
>> …
>>
>> …& that proposal has been enormously successful, & is sweeping this
>> country. Maybe its century of traditional precedent has something to do
>> with its success.
>>
>> …
>>
>> When RCV was  initially being adopted, of course there were no
>> computers, & so Condorcet’s complete pairwise-count would be infeasible in
>> a large election. Sure, the Sequential-Pairwise (SP) pairwise-count only
>> needs about twice as much vote-counting as RCV.
>>
>> …
>>
>> (Approval, Score, STAR & RCV all need roughly the same amount of
>> vote-counting (they all vary greatly), & SP needs about twice as much.)
>>
>> …
>>
>> Maybe people didn’t want twice as much vote-counting. Or maybe they were
>> afraid that SP would be rejected because of its Pareto violation (which I
>> consider irrelevant, just like MinMax’s Condorcet-Loser violation).
>>
>> …
>>
>> Then there’s Coombs, which I guess would have about the same amount of
>> vote-counting as RCV. But maybe they didn’t like Coombs because things
>> could get ridiculous, like when I nominate Dracula in the primary, so that
>> we can bury the Democrat under Dracula.
>>
>> …
>>
>> …but of course there are worse things than ridiculous.  Maybe we haven’t
>> been fair to Coombs.
>>
>> …
>>
>> As I said, I prefer Condorcet, in its best versions, but it’s RCV that
>> has the activist movement, big well-funded national organization,
>> lobbyists, experienced & active campaign-managers, & big successes all
>> around this country.
>>
>> …
>>
>> …with (I’ve read) on the order of 60 municipalities & 2 states having
>> adopted RCV.
>>
>> …
>>
>> If RCV, & not Condorcet, is succeeding, we Condorcetists have nothing to
>> complain about. When the RCVists were doing the work, we weren’t out there
>> enacting anything.  Don’t blame the RCVists for that..
>>
>> …
>>
>> We should acknowledge, commend & appreciate what the RCV organization has
>> accomplished.
>>
>> …
>>
>> [quote]
>>
>> RCV is already poorly understood.
>>
>> [/quote]
>>
>> …
>>
>> RCV is enormously popular with progressives & progressive organizations &
>> parties, such as the GPUSA, the U.S. Greens.   …because they understand
>> that rank-balloting will allow them to express all of their preferences
>> among the candidates.
>>
>> …
>>
>> …& because they’ve been correctly informed that RCV has genuine strong
>> majority properties, when it coalesces the Mutual-Majority.  ..even if
>> they haven’t heard about the details of those properties.
>>
>> …
>>
>> As for RCV’s definition, RCV can be defined very briefly, in one sentence:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Repeatedly eliminate the candidate who tops fewest rankings, till someone
>> tops most of them.
>>
>> …
>>
>> [end of brief RCV definition]
>>
> Brief definition of Benham:
>
> Repeatedly eliminate the candidate who tops the fewest rankings until
> someone tops most of them in every head-head matchup (between it and any
> other uneliminated candidate).
>
> fws
>
>> …
>>
>> [quote]
>>
>> When I moved to San Francisco in 2011, I expected to grudgingly like
>> voting in RCV elections, and I expected to enjoy ranking my choices   What
>> I found instead was that very few people here understand how votes are
>> counted
>>
>> [/quote]
>>
>> …
>>
>> They would if they heard RCV’s brief definition.
>>
>> …
>>
>> [quote]
>>
>> , and many folks in my lefty political tribe here take great pride in
>> their ignorance of math and the inner workings of their electoral system,
>> trusting that the powers-that-be will count things correctly.
>>
>> [/quote]
>>
>> …
>>
>> …& they’re right, when the method is RCV.  (…& likewise would be, with a
>> good Condorcet version too.)
>>
>> …
>>
>> [quote]
>>
>> As "exhibit A", I will point to the recent clown show in Alameda County
>> (i.e. just a few miles east of me, on the other side of a puddle known as
>> the "San Francisco Bay"):
>>
>> …
>>
>>
>> https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Alameda-County-admits-tallying-error-in-17682520.php
>>
>> …
>>
>>  It would seem that they had been counting RCV elections wrong for
>> DECADES, and only noticed the problem in 2022.  Simplicity and precinct
>> summability matters.
>>
>> [/quote]
>>
>> …
>>
>> RCV’s brief definition is simple. RCV is simple, natural & obvious.
>>
>> …
>>
>> There’s a lot of mis-statement about “Precinct-Summability”, &
>> questionable-ness about what “Precinct Summability” is supposed to mean..
>>
>> …
>>
>> Plurality, Approval & Score:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Candidates’ vote totals are summed in each precinct & sent to a central
>> count-place, where there’s a central tabulation.
>>
>> …
>>
>> STAR:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Same, at first. Then the central counting place determines the two top
>> scorers, & then presumably sends that information to the precincts, which
>> still have the rankings, & the precincts each total the pairwise votes for
>> each of the finalists over the other, & they all send that back to the
>> central location, where the results are summed & the final winner reported.
>>
>> …
>>
>> Condorcet:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Each precinct counts the preference votes for A over B, & for B over A,
>> for each of the N(N-1)/2 pairs {A,B}.  …& those totals are sent in to
>> the central location, where the winner is determined according to the rules
>> of whatever Condorcet version is being used.
>>
>> …
>>
>> RCV:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Each precinct counts the top-count score of each candidate, & sends that
>> in to the central location.
>>
>> …
>>
>> The central location totals that count for each candidate, to determine
>> which has lowest top-score, & sends that information back to the precincts.
>>
>> …
>>
>> Each precinct eliminates that candidate from its rankings, & repeats the
>> first line above.
>>
>> …
>>
>> Repeat till the central location finds that one candidate tops most of
>> the rankings.
>>
>> ---
>>
>> Notice something similar about those?  Every one of those procedures
>> requires counts at the precincts, & also at the central location, &
>> communication between the two.
>>
>> …
>>
>> How is RCV different?  It does such a procedure a number of times.
>> That’s it. That’s the difference.
>>
>> …
>>
>> So it’s questionable regarding what is this “Precinct Summability” that
>> Plurailty, Approval, Score, STAR & Condorcet all have, but RCV allegedly
>> doesn’t have.
>>
>> …
>>
>> The same security measures, precautions & audits can be done with RCV as
>> with any of the other methods whose procedures are described above.
>>
>> …
>>
>> [quote]
>>
>> [quote]
>>
>> Strategy-evaluation for Condorcet-complying pairwise-count methods has
>> proven to be complicated & more difficult than one would expect.
>>
>> [/quote]
>>
>> …
>>
>> This I will agree with. That is why I've hopped on the approval voting
>> bandwagon for single-winner reform.
>>
>> [/quote]
>>
>> …
>>
>> That’s a bit hasty. Undeniably some of the pairwise-count
>> Condorcet-compliant methods thwart &/or deter offensive strategy so well
>> that it won’t be a problem, & the election of the sincere-CW will virtually
>> always be elected.
>>
>> …
>>
>> There’s the argument that there are so many good Condorcet versions that
>> choosing between them is prohibitively problematic, preventing the adoption
>> of any of them.
>>
>> …
>>
>> No, several of the best versions can be offered to a proposal-committee,
>> & it can discuss & evaluate them & then choose a proposal.
>>
>> …
>>
>> …& there are a few obviously simplest proposals, making the choice a lot
>> less complicated & difficult than antii-Condorcetists claim:
>>
>> …
>>
>> MinMax:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Elect the candidate whose greatest defeat is the least.
>>
>> …
>>
>> (…implying the election of an unbeaten candidate when there is one ( as
>> there nearly always is) ).
>>
>> …
>>
>> Condorcet//Approval:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. If no one is
>> pairwise-unbeaten, then elect the most approved candidate.
>>
>> …
>>
>> Majority-Defeat Disquaification//Approval (MDDA):
>>
>> …
>>
>> Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. Elect any
>> unbeaten candidate. If there are none, then every majority pairwise-beaten
>> candidate is disqualified, & the un-disqualified candidate with most
>> approvals is elected.
>>
>> …
>>
>> (I’ve added a Condorcet-winner electing clause, because I now feel that
>> Condorcet’s failure-betrayal scenario is so rare & unpredictable as to be
>> irrelevant to strategy.)
>>
>> …
>>
>> Sequential-Pairwise:
>>
>> …
>>
>> Order the candidates in a list such that the ones topping more rankings
>> are listed below the ones topping fewer rankings.
>>
>> …
>>
>> Find the pairwise-winner among the top 2 candidates in the ordering. Then
>> find the pairwise winner between that winner & the next candidate down the
>> list.  Condtinue until you’ve found the winner of the then-current
>> winner & the last candidate in the list. S/he wins.
>>
>> ----------
>>
>> I’d offer those 4 simple pairwise-count versions.
>>
>> …
>>
>> I’d also offer Approval, in case the jurisdiction either couldn’t afford,
>> or didn’t want to spend for, rank-balloting equipment & software.
>>
>> …
>>
>> I’d also offer RCV & STAR, because some proposal-committee members might
>> prefer them.
>>
>> …
>>
>> I’d personally propose & justify the choice of a Pairwise-Count, with RCV
>> as next choice, & of course Approval if rank-balloting is infeasible or
>> rejected.
>>
>> …
>>
>> If there were a ranked vote in the proposal committee, of course my
>> ranking would be:
>>
>> …
>>
>> 1. Some ordering of the above-listed four Pairwise-Count methods
>>
>> …
>>
>> 2. RCV
>>
>> …
>>
>> 3. Approval if ranked-balloting is infeasible or rejected.
>>
>> -----
>>
>> Yes, I like Approval. Under different conditions, normal conditions, it
>> would be my suggestion, though STAR would then be okay too.
>>
>> …
>>
>> But our voting-conditions are anything but normal.
>>
>> …
>>
>> We always have a sleazy & corrupt POS “lesser”-evil, & a
>> dramatically-horrifying greater-evil.  (…& some better candidates who,
>> our media insist, are unwinnable, minor, not-serious, candidates.)
>>
>> …
>>
>> We’re constantly told that the greater evil is the only bad result, & so
>> we have to support the “lesser-evil” against the greater-evil (…& against
>> our favorite).
>>
>> …
>>
>> Always.
>>
>> …
>>
>> It’s always this same discouraging, dismal & hopeless situation.
>>
>> …
>>
>> That isn’t normal.  It certainly isn’t natural.
>>
>> …
>>
>> So yes, I’d suggest Approval under normal conditions. But our highly,
>> bizarrely, abnormal & unnatural conditions require special methods to deal
>> with the (allegedly) hard choice between genuinely-wanted outcomes, &
>> odious dismal regrettable & deplorable “lesser” evils.
>>
>> …
>>
>> For these conditions, we need something more powerfully-discriminating: a
>> rank-method, to let everyone vote all their preferences among as many
>> candidates as they want to.   …to elicit & count genuine favoriteness  immediately.
>>
>>
>> …
>>
>> (…not after several election-cycles, because a lot of harm can be done in
>> 4 years or 8 years.)
>>
>> …
>>
>> It’s like when, in _The Godfather_, Michael says to his attorney:
>>
>> …
>>
>> “No, you’re a peacetime consiglieri, but right now we need a wartime
>> consiglieri.”
>>
> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>
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