[EM] Reply to Rob regarding RCV

Sat Sep 23 14:52:38 PDT 2023

On Sat, Sep 23, 2023, 11:19 AM Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Hi Rob—
>
> …
>
> You wrote:
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> Oh Michael...where do I begin?  Your apparent move to the dark side makes
> me sad.  I realize that this intro may sound condescending, but I truly
> don't mean it that way.  I deeply respect your opinion. YOU were the one
> who taught me about "center squeeze" in 1995 or so, and made me rethink
> AV/PV/IRV/RCV (or whatever the name of the week is).
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> Yes, earlier I was quite critical of RCV (called IRV in those days, before
> San Francisco insisted on RCV, because “instant” was misleading people to
> expect an instantaneous count).
>
> …
>
> I was wrong.
>
> …
>
> You know that often the relative merits, advantages & disadvantages of
> single-winner methods aren’t what they at first seem. Never be prematurely
> sure that someone is wrong about such matters.
>
> …
>
> But I would like to remind you that I also continue to say that Condorcet,
> in its best versions, is my favorite, because, always electing the CW, it
> best gets rid of the lesser-of-2-evils problem (LO2E) for any & every  kind
> of voter, thereby accommodating even the most timid LO2E giveaway voter.
>
> …
>
> As I said, RCV only works & has merit if the voters aren’t timid
> overcomromising LO2E giveaway voters.
>
> …
>
> I don’t deny that Condorcet-failure is a disadvantage, but, with a good
> electorate, it doesn’t matter. I used to say that Approval’s equal-givaway,
> amounting to an abstention between Favorite & Lesser-Evil, is better than
> RCV’s favorite-burial…but not if you have an electorate that won’t do the
> burial !!!
>
> …
>
> Approval & STAR encourage Mr. Timid to do giveaway. RCV encourages
> everyone to be frank, honest, ambitious, hopeful !!!
>
> …
>
> …because, as I said, that won’t be a problem, because an electorate that
> has enacted RCV didn’t do so because they want & intend to vote a
> hold-you-nose lesser-evil over their favorite (They can & do do that now,
> in Plurality). If they enact RCV it’s because they want & intend to
> sincerely rank the candidates, expressing & fully-supporting their favorite.
>
>
> …
>
> …& so THEY WILL DO SO !!!
>
> …
>
> So don’t worry about LO2E strategy in RCV voting.
>
> …
>
> Anti-RCVists often say that RCV doesn’t really honor majority.
>
> …
>
> But, as I’ve been saying, though RCV doesn’t meet the Condorcet Criterion,
> it meets the Mutual-Majority Criterion (MMC).  Let me state an improved &
> expanded definition of MMC:
>
> …
>
> MMC:
>
> …
>
> If there are 1 or more sets of candidates such that a majority of the
> voters prefer the candidates of that set to everyone outside the set, then
> the winner should come from such a set.
>
> …
>
> (Then it goes without saying that, when there’s a Mutual-Majority (defined
> below) the winner will come from that Mutual-Majority.)
>
> …
>
>  [end of MMC definition]
>
> …
>
> A majority who all prefer some set of candidates to everyone outside that
> set, I call an Agreeing-Majority.
>
> …
>
> A majority who all prefer *the same* set of candidates to everyone outside
> that set, I call a  Mutual-Majority.
>
> …
>
> (Arguably a weaker definition of a Mutual-Majority would do: A majority
> who all prefer all of their favorites to everyone outside the set of all
> their favorites.)
>
> …
>
> When there are 1 or more Agreeing-Majorities, RCV always elects the
> candidate of the largest faction of  an Agreeing-Majority.
>
> …
>
> i.e. under those conditions, RCV always elects the favorite of an
> Agreeing-Majority.
>
> …
>
> RCV always elects the candidate of the largest faction of the
> Mutual-Majority.
>
> …
>
> i.e. RCV always elects the favorite of the Mutual-Majority.
>
> …
>
> That candidate isn’t an unpopular extremist, but instead has strong
> genuine majority coalition support, as defined above.
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> I just think you're incorrect about FairVote.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> I didn’t say anything about FairVote.
>
> …
>
> Whether you like FairVote or not, that has no bearing on the merits of RCV.
>
> …
>
> FairVote, from the start, has insisted on offering the traditional RCV.  We
> should respect that choice. RCV has about a century of precedent in
> Australia & Ireland. Proposing a traditional method with long precedent is
> a valid practical choice, & one that we should respect.
>
> …
>
> …& that proposal has been enormously successful, & is sweeping this
> country. Maybe its century of traditional precedent has something to do
> with its success.
>
> …
>
> When RCV was  initially being adopted, of course there were no computers,
> & so Condorcet’s complete pairwise-count would be infeasible in a large
> election. Sure, the Sequential-Pairwise (SP) pairwise-count only needs
> about twice as much vote-counting as RCV.
>
> …
>
> (Approval, Score, STAR & RCV all need roughly the same amount of
> vote-counting (they all vary greatly), & SP needs about twice as much.)
>
> …
>
> Maybe people didn’t want twice as much vote-counting. Or maybe they were
> afraid that SP would be rejected because of its Pareto violation (which I
> consider irrelevant, just like MinMax’s Condorcet-Loser violation).
>
> …
>
> Then there’s Coombs, which I guess would have about the same amount of
> vote-counting as RCV. But maybe they didn’t like Coombs because things
> could get ridiculous, like when I nominate Dracula in the primary, so that
> we can bury the Democrat under Dracula.
>
> …
>
> …but of course there are worse things than ridiculous.  Maybe we haven’t
> been fair to Coombs.
>
> …
>
> As I said, I prefer Condorcet, in its best versions, but it’s RCV that has
> the activist movement, big well-funded national organization, lobbyists,
> experienced & active campaign-managers, & big successes all around this
> country.
>
> …
>
> …with (I’ve read) on the order of 60 municipalities & 2 states having
> adopted RCV.
>
> …
>
> If RCV, & not Condorcet, is succeeding, we Condorcetists have nothing to
> complain about. When the RCVists were doing the work, we weren’t out there
> enacting anything.  Don’t blame the RCVists for that..
>
> …
>
> We should acknowledge, commend & appreciate what the RCV organization has
> accomplished.
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> RCV is already poorly understood.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> RCV is enormously popular with progressives & progressive organizations &
> parties, such as the GPUSA, the U.S. Greens.   …because they understand
> that rank-balloting will allow them to express all of their preferences
> among the candidates.
>
> …
>
> …& because they’ve been correctly informed that RCV has genuine strong
> majority properties, when it coalesces the Mutual-Majority.  ..even if
> they haven’t heard about the details of those properties.
>
> …
>
> As for RCV’s definition, RCV can be defined very briefly, in one sentence:
>
> …
>
> Repeatedly eliminate the candidate who tops fewest rankings, till someone
> tops most of them.
>
> …
>
> [end of brief RCV definition]
>
Brief definition of Benham:

Repeatedly eliminate the candidate who tops the fewest rankings until
someone tops most of them in every head-head matchup (between it and any
other uneliminated candidate).

fws

> …
>
> [quote]
>
> When I moved to San Francisco in 2011, I expected to grudgingly like
> voting in RCV elections, and I expected to enjoy ranking my choices   What
> I found instead was that very few people here understand how votes are
> counted
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> They would if they heard RCV’s brief definition.
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> , and many folks in my lefty political tribe here take great pride in
> their ignorance of math and the inner workings of their electoral system,
> trusting that the powers-that-be will count things correctly.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> …& they’re right, when the method is RCV.  (…& likewise would be, with a
> good Condorcet version too.)
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> As "exhibit A", I will point to the recent clown show in Alameda County
> (i.e. just a few miles east of me, on the other side of a puddle known as
> the "San Francisco Bay"):
>
> …
>
>
> https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Alameda-County-admits-tallying-error-in-17682520.php
>
> …
>
>  It would seem that they had been counting RCV elections wrong for
> DECADES, and only noticed the problem in 2022.  Simplicity and precinct
> summability matters.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> RCV’s brief definition is simple. RCV is simple, natural & obvious.
>
> …
>
> There’s a lot of mis-statement about “Precinct-Summability”, &
> questionable-ness about what “Precinct Summability” is supposed to mean..
>
> …
>
> Plurality, Approval & Score:
>
> …
>
> Candidates’ vote totals are summed in each precinct & sent to a central
> count-place, where there’s a central tabulation.
>
> …
>
> STAR:
>
> …
>
> Same, at first. Then the central counting place determines the two top
> scorers, & then presumably sends that information to the precincts, which
> still have the rankings, & the precincts each total the pairwise votes for
> each of the finalists over the other, & they all send that back to the
> central location, where the results are summed & the final winner reported.
>
> …
>
> Condorcet:
>
> …
>
> Each precinct counts the preference votes for A over B, & for B over A,
> for each of the N(N-1)/2 pairs {A,B}.  …& those totals are sent in to the
> central location, where the winner is determined according to the rules of
> whatever Condorcet version is being used.
>
> …
>
> RCV:
>
> …
>
> Each precinct counts the top-count score of each candidate, & sends that
> in to the central location.
>
> …
>
> The central location totals that count for each candidate, to determine
> which has lowest top-score, & sends that information back to the precincts.
>
> …
>
> Each precinct eliminates that candidate from its rankings, & repeats the
> first line above.
>
> …
>
> Repeat till the central location finds that one candidate tops most of the
> rankings.
>
> ---
>
> Notice something similar about those?  Every one of those procedures
> requires counts at the precincts, & also at the central location, &
> communication between the two.
>
> …
>
> How is RCV different?  It does such a procedure a number of times. That’s
> it. That’s the difference.
>
> …
>
> So it’s questionable regarding what is this “Precinct Summability” that
> Plurailty, Approval, Score, STAR & Condorcet all have, but RCV allegedly
> doesn’t have.
>
> …
>
> The same security measures, precautions & audits can be done with RCV as
> with any of the other methods whose procedures are described above.
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> [quote]
>
> Strategy-evaluation for Condorcet-complying pairwise-count methods has
> proven to be complicated & more difficult than one would expect.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> This I will agree with. That is why I've hopped on the approval voting
> bandwagon for single-winner reform.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> That’s a bit hasty. Undeniably some of the pairwise-count
> Condorcet-compliant methods thwart &/or deter offensive strategy so well
> that it won’t be a problem, & the election of the sincere-CW will virtually
> always be elected.
>
> …
>
> There’s the argument that there are so many good Condorcet versions that
> choosing between them is prohibitively problematic, preventing the adoption
> of any of them.
>
> …
>
> No, several of the best versions can be offered to a proposal-committee, &
> it can discuss & evaluate them & then choose a proposal.
>
> …
>
> …& there are a few obviously simplest proposals, making the choice a lot
> less complicated & difficult than antii-Condorcetists claim:
>
> …
>
> MinMax:
>
> …
>
> Elect the candidate whose greatest defeat is the least.
>
> …
>
> (…implying the election of an unbeaten candidate when there is one ( as
> there nearly always is) ).
>
> …
>
> Condorcet//Approval:
>
> …
>
> Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. If no one is
> pairwise-unbeaten, then elect the most approved candidate.
>
> …
>
> Majority-Defeat Disquaification//Approval (MDDA):
>
> …
>
> Your ranking is counted as approving everyone you rank. Elect any unbeaten
> candidate. If there are none, then every majority pairwise-beaten candidate
> is disqualified, & the un-disqualified candidate with most approvals is
> elected.
>
> …
>
> (I’ve added a Condorcet-winner electing clause, because I now feel that
> Condorcet’s failure-betrayal scenario is so rare & unpredictable as to be
> irrelevant to strategy.)
>
> …
>
> Sequential-Pairwise:
>
> …
>
> Order the candidates in a list such that the ones topping more rankings
> are listed below the ones topping fewer rankings.
>
> …
>
> Find the pairwise-winner among the top 2 candidates in the ordering. Then
> find the pairwise winner between that winner & the next candidate down the
> list.  Condtinue until you’ve found the winner of the then-current winner
> & the last candidate in the list. S/he wins.
>
> ----------
>
> I’d offer those 4 simple pairwise-count versions.
>
> …
>
> I’d also offer Approval, in case the jurisdiction either couldn’t afford,
> or didn’t want to spend for, rank-balloting equipment & software.
>
> …
>
> I’d also offer RCV & STAR, because some proposal-committee members might
> prefer them.
>
> …
>
> I’d personally propose & justify the choice of a Pairwise-Count, with RCV
> as next choice, & of course Approval if rank-balloting is infeasible or
> rejected.
>
> …
>
> If there were a ranked vote in the proposal committee, of course my
> ranking would be:
>
> …
>
> 1. Some ordering of the above-listed four Pairwise-Count methods
>
> …
>
> 2. RCV
>
> …
>
> 3. Approval if ranked-balloting is infeasible or rejected.
>
> -----
>
> Yes, I like Approval. Under different conditions, normal conditions, it
> would be my suggestion, though STAR would then be okay too.
>
> …
>
> But our voting-conditions are anything but normal.
>
> …
>
> We always have a sleazy & corrupt POS “lesser”-evil, & a
> dramatically-horrifying greater-evil.  (…& some better candidates who,
> our media insist, are unwinnable, minor, not-serious, candidates.)
>
> …
>
> We’re constantly told that the greater evil is the only bad result, & so
> we have to support the “lesser-evil” against the greater-evil (…& against
> our favorite).
>
> …
>
> Always.
>
> …
>
> It’s always this same discouraging, dismal & hopeless situation.
>
> …
>
> That isn’t normal.  It certainly isn’t natural.
>
> …
>
> So yes, I’d suggest Approval under normal conditions. But our highly,
> bizarrely, abnormal & unnatural conditions require special methods to deal
> with the (allegedly) hard choice between genuinely-wanted outcomes, &
> odious dismal regrettable & deplorable “lesser” evils.
>
> …
>
> For these conditions, we need something more powerfully-discriminating: a
> rank-method, to let everyone vote all their preferences among as many
> candidates as they want to.   …to elicit & count genuine favoriteness  immediately.
>
>
> …
>
> (…not after several election-cycles, because a lot of harm can be done in
> 4 years or 8 years.)
>
> …
>
> It’s like when, in _The Godfather_, Michael says to his attorney:
>
> …
>
> “No, you’re a peacetime consiglieri, but right now we need a wartime
> consiglieri.”
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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