[EM] Smith+IRV//Approval

Forest Simmons forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
Mon Sep 18 18:03:57 PDT 2023

On Sun, Sep 17, 2023, 11:12 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>

> On 2023-09-17 18:14, Colin Champion wrote:
> > Chris - as I understand it, there's no reason to expect Condorcet voting
> > to produce satisfactory results if applied seat-by-seat to
> > representative assemblies. Some voting theory texts have a disclaimer
> > near the beginning: "We here discuss the election of a single
> > office-holder (eg. a president); election of individual members to an
> > assembly brings in additional considerations" (which are never
> discussed).
> Plurality can be used as a rough semiproportional method that's
> proportional under strategy (SNTV).

Plurality elects the candidate with the highest likelihood of being random
plurality ballot favorite.

So how about electing the candidate with the greatest likelihood of being
the random approval ballot winner RABW.

The probabilities can be found analytically by exponentiating Markov
Transition Matrices ... or approximately by MonteCarlo.

The Random Approval Ballot Favorite probability distribution is
democratically proportional like the random plurality favorite  probability
distribution ... but with less entropy ... i.e. greater expected consenus.

> But bloc Condorcet isn't. I suspect
> that Condorcet failing to be at-large proportional when used for single
> member districts is related to this quirk in Plurality. In a way,
> Condorcet is too majoritarian.
> >     At any rate, if a country is governed by a parliamentary assembly,
> > then the primary the aim of an election should be to produce an
> > effective government whose policies are as close as possible to the
> > consensus view of the electorate. This will not usually be achieved by
> > giving each constituency a representative who is close to its local
> > consensus.
> >     I made a proposal of my own a couple of years ago:
> >
> http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2021-October/003113.html
> >      My main concern was to avoid the minority governments which
> > generally arise when FPTP is replaced by less crude methods. As for
> > traction... I'm still its sole supporter.
> I think a ranked party list method with a centrist-favoring bias would
> work relatively well: to be what something like D'Hondt should have
> been, and favor consensus/centrist kingmakers instead of random minor
> parties or whatever party happens to get the most Plurality votes.
> But I might be coming from a different perspective: in Norway, minority
> governments are more common than not, and the legislature-executive
> balance of power is much more in favor of the legislature than is common
> elsewhere, but things generally work out. Using ranking and a
> centrist/consensus bias would reduce the need for thresholds and ad-hoc
> tweaks to Sainte-Laguë[1]; they wouldn't eliminate minority governments
> unless the bias were much harsher than I have in mind.
> -km
> [1]
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sainte-Lagu%C3%AB_method#Modified_Sainte-Lagu%C3%AB_method
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