[EM] Condorcet meeting

[Forest Simmons]

On Fri, Sep 1, 2023, 2:55 PM C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

>
>
>
>
>
> Kristofer,
>
> Then I construct a method that's intended to be cloneproof, and then you
> say that clone independence is a bad thing, because more extreme clones
> can support more moderate ones and make the latter win.
>
> I don't recognise that as a quote or paraphrase of what I said.  I
> referred to extreme and
> moderate candidates on the same wing.
>
> "Clones" are candidates that all the voters rank together. Although all
> the extreme wing voters
> might give their second preference (if they don't bullet vote) to the
> moderate candidate on the same wing,
> most of the moderate wing supporters typically prefer a centre candidate
> and/or maybe even a moderate
> candidate on the other wing to the extreme candidate on their wing.  So
> they are usually not clones.
>
> As to it being a "good thing", more voters having their favourite on the
> ballot encourages greater turnout
> and the lower preferences of sure losers can obviously effect the result
> and that is just as likely to help any
> given major candidate as harm it.
>
> Should this kind of method pass clone independence in
> the sense that cloning some group's candidates should never change the
> number picked from that group to be finalists -- or not?
>
> I don't  see any particular point in it doing that.  We should try to
> allow every significant "group" at least
> one finalist candidate.  All good election methods that we might use for
> the final can easily handle a few nobodies
> on the ballot, so subject to logistic practicability we should err on the
> side of doing that.
>
> First I suggest using Approval, to which you say this will lead to the
> selection of a bunch of clones.
>
> If it is just "select the top N most approved candidates" then yes that
> could just lead to all the finalists
> being clones of the Approval winner, and if approval ballots are used
> there will be pressure from some
> "in the real world" to use that most simple and seemingly obvious system.
>
> But say despite all that we use approval ballots in the primary to choose
> N finalists.
>
> I suggest first the most approved candidate qualifies, then the candidate
> with the most approval
> opposition to the approval winner qualifies, and then the candidate with
> the most approval opposition
> to those two qualifies, and so on, each time selecting the candidate that
> is most approved on ballots that
> don't approve any of the already qualified candidates until we have the
> desired N number of finalists.
>

This seems like an ideal situation (if ever there could be) for making
appropriate use of implicit approval ... meaning "out of this huge field of
candidates I considered these to at least be worth ranking."

Just don't read more into the implicit approval count than that fact.

>
> That would be much much better than just the FPP or Approval top N
> candidates, but still a lot worse than
> my IRV last N suggestion.
>
> Chris B
>
>
> *Kristofer Munsterhjelm* km_elmet at t-online.de
> <election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3Cec28b577-92c6-73bf-8e2d-dcf02d0bf778%40t-online.de%3E>
> *Thu Aug 31 05:26:41 PDT 2023*
>
>
>    -
>
> ------------------------------
>
> On 8/30/23 09:17, Chris Benham wrote:
> > >* Kristofer,
> *> >* IMHO this is all far too complicated and completely wrong-headed.
> *> >* For one thing, it seems to assume that major candidates have some
> *>* interest in, or in some way benefit from, displacing minor candidates
> *>* off the final ballot.
> *> >* In fact, with voluntary voting, they are just as likely to be harmed
> *>* by them doing that as helped.  Major moderate wing candidates can
> *>* benefit by minor (sure loser) more extreme candidates on the same
> *>* wing being on the ballot, because they inspire more voters to turn
> *>* out who will help that moderate wing candidate to defeat the other
> *>* major candidate/s.
> *
> Then I'm sorry, but I don't know what the desiderata are.
>
> First I suggest using Approval, to which you say this will lead to the
> selection of a bunch of clones.
>
> Then I construct a method that's intended to be cloneproof, and then you
> say that clone independence is a bad thing, because more extreme clones
> can support more moderate ones and make the latter win.
>
> So which is it? Should this kind of method pass clone independence in
> the sense that cloning some group's candidates should never change the
> number picked from that group to be finalists -- or not?
>
> Maybe this shows that we need to nail down what the method is supposed
> to accomplish before designing it.
>
> -km
>
>
>
>
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