<div dir="auto"><div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Sep 1, 2023, 2:55 PM C.Benham <<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<p>Kristofer,<br>
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<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Then I construct a method that's intended to be cloneproof, and then you
say that clone independence is a bad thing, because more extreme clones
can support more moderate ones and make the latter win.</pre>
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I don't recognise that as a quote or paraphrase of what I said. I
referred to extreme and<br>
moderate candidates on the same wing. <br>
<br>
"Clones" are candidates that all the voters rank together.
Although all the extreme wing voters <br>
might give their second preference (if they don't bullet vote) to
the moderate candidate on the same wing, <br>
most of the moderate wing supporters typically prefer a centre
candidate and/or maybe even a moderate <br>
candidate on the other wing to the extreme candidate on their
wing. So they are usually not clones.<br>
<br>
As to it being a "good thing", more voters having their favourite
on the ballot encourages greater turnout<br>
and the lower preferences of sure losers can obviously effect the
result and that is just as likely to help any<br>
given major candidate as harm it.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Should this kind of method pass clone independence in
the sense that cloning some group's candidates should never change the
number picked from that group to be finalists -- or not?</pre>
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I don't see any particular point in it doing that. We should try
to allow every significant "group" at least<br>
one finalist candidate. All good election methods that we might
use for the final can easily handle a few nobodies<br>
on the ballot, so subject to logistic practicability we should err
on the side of doing that.<br>
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">First I suggest using Approval, to which you say this will lead to the
selection of a bunch of clones.</pre>
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If it is just "select the top N most approved candidates" then yes
that could just lead to all the finalists<br>
being clones of the Approval winner, and if approval ballots are
used there will be pressure from some<br>
"in the real world" to use that most simple and seemingly obvious
system.<br>
<br>
But say despite all that we use approval ballots in the primary to
choose N finalists. <br>
<br>
I suggest first the most approved candidate qualifies, then the
candidate with the most approval <br>
opposition to the approval winner qualifies, and then the
candidate with the most approval opposition<br>
to those two qualifies, and so on, each time selecting the
candidate that is most approved on ballots that<br>
don't approve any of the already qualified candidates until we
have the desired N number of finalists.<br></div></blockquote></div></div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">This seems like an ideal situation (if ever there could be) for making appropriate use of implicit approval ... meaning "out of this huge field of candidates I considered these to at least be worth ranking." </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Just don't read more into the implicit approval count than that fact.</div><div dir="auto"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>
<br>
That would be much much better than just the FPP or Approval top N
candidates, but still a lot worse than<br>
my IRV last N suggestion.<br>
<br>
Chris B<br>
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<blockquote type="cite"><b style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Kristofer Munsterhjelm</b><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;display:inline!important;float:none"><span> </span></span><a href="mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3Cec28b577-92c6-73bf-8e2d-dcf02d0bf778%40t-online.de%3E" title="[EM] Condorcet meeting" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">km_elmet at t-online.de</a><br>
<i>Thu Aug 31 05:26:41 PDT 2023</i><span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times New Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;display:inline!important;float:none"></span>
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<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">On 8/30/23 09:17, Chris Benham wrote:
><i>
</i>><i> Kristofer,
</i>><i>
</i>><i> IMHO this is all far too complicated and completely wrong-headed.
</i>><i>
</i>><i> For one thing, it seems to assume that major candidates have some
</i>><i> interest in, or in some way benefit from, displacing minor candidates
</i>><i> off the final ballot.
</i>><i>
</i>><i> In fact, with voluntary voting, they are just as likely to be harmed
</i>><i> by them doing that as helped. Major moderate wing candidates can
</i>><i> benefit by minor (sure loser) more extreme candidates on the same
</i>><i> wing being on the ballot, because they inspire more voters to turn
</i>><i> out who will help that moderate wing candidate to defeat the other
</i>><i> major candidate/s.
</i>
Then I'm sorry, but I don't know what the desiderata are.
First I suggest using Approval, to which you say this will lead to the
selection of a bunch of clones.
Then I construct a method that's intended to be cloneproof, and then you
say that clone independence is a bad thing, because more extreme clones
can support more moderate ones and make the latter win.
So which is it? Should this kind of method pass clone independence in
the sense that cloning some group's candidates should never change the
number picked from that group to be finalists -- or not?
Maybe this shows that we need to nail down what the method is supposed
to accomplish before designing it.
-km
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