[EM] Improved IRV

[Richard Lung]

There's been a dramatically democratically improved IRV since about 
1850, it's called the Hare system ("Andrae system", in Scandinava).

There's been a decisively improved Borda method since 1880. It's called 
the Gregory method. It is why statisticians prefer weighting in 
arithmetic proportion (Gregory method) to weighting in arithmetic 
progression (Borda method). They only use the latter when they have to 
assume the magnitudes of intervals in their tabulations of data collection.

Personally, I doubt whether pairwise contests are really suitable for 
more than single member contests (which are monopolistic not democratic 
enough, despite politicians contentions). My limited experience is that, 
in single member contests, weighted Condorcet and Borda methods are in 
agreement, as rational counts of quite marginal contests, compared to 
mere elimination methods, like Suppementary Vote, FPTP, IRV/AV, which 
are only ordinal scale measures (of more or less), not more accurate 
rational representations of data.

Regards,

Richard Lung.



On 25/03/2023 07:17, Forest Simmons wrote:
> 1. Let PL be the Pairwise Loser between the two candidates with the 
> fewest transferred  votes.
>
> 2. Eliminate every candidate that does not beat PL pairwise, including 
> PL itself.
>
> 3. While more than one candidate remains,' repeat steps 1 and 2.
>
> Now Improved Coombs:
>
> 1. Let PL be the Pairwise Loser between the two candidates with the 
> greatest Bottom  counts among the remaining candidates.
>
> 2. Eliminate every candidate that does not beat PL pairwise, including 
> PL itself.
>
> 3. While more than one candidate remains,' repeat steps 1 and 2.
>
> Improved Borda:
>
> 1. Let PL be the Pairwise Loser between the two candidates with the 
> smallest  Borda Counts  among the remaining candidates.
>
> 2. Eliminate every candidate that does not beat PL pairwise, including 
> PL itself.
>
> 3. While more than one candidate remains,' repeat steps 1 and 2.
>
> Improved Score
>
> 1. Let PL be the Pairwise Loser between the two candidates with the 
> least  scores among the remaining candidates.
>
> 2. Eliminate every candidate that does not beat PL pairwise, including 
> PL itself.
>
> 3. While more than one candidate remains,' repeat steps 1 and 2.
>
> Improved Academic Washout Elimination
> 1. Let PL be the Pairwise Loser between the two candidates with the 
> least GPA among the remaining candidates.
>
> 2. Eliminate every candidate that does not beat PL pairwise, including 
> PL itself.
>
> 3. While more than one candidate remains,' repeat steps 1 and 2.
>
> Improved SPE
> 1. Let PL be the Pairwise Loser between the two candidates nearest the 
> worst end of the Elimination Agenda among the remaining candidates.
>
> 2. Eliminate every candidate that does not beat PL pairwise, including 
> PL itself.
>
> 3. While more than one candidate remains,' repeat steps 1 and 2.
>
> Of all these improved methods this one is the only one that preserves 
> monotonicity ... which is why it is the one singled out for a 
> progression proposal.
>
> But all of these methods are Banks efficient ... hence Landau 
> efficient ... which prevents the embarrassment of electing winner that 
> is covered by a loser.
>
> None of the extant methods have that guarantee... not Rannked Pairs, 
> nor CSSD, nor Kemeny-Young , etc.
>
> -Forest
>
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> ----
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