[EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 223, Issue 45: Richard Lung's contribution

[Richard Lung]

To Steve Bosworth,


  Thank you for your notice.

I believe have answered this question before. My understanding is that 
sciences generally depend for their advancement on a transition from 
classification to enumeration of their data. (A N Whitehead observed 
so.} I have personally found this to be the case.


Good wishes,

Richard Lung.




On 01/03/2023 05:52, steve bosworth wrote:
>
>
> Today's Topics:
>
>    TO: Richar Lung
>   FROM: Steve Bosworth
> Richard, in response to your appropriate valuing of"multi-member range 
> of representation" in your contribution fully repeated below, I wonder 
> whether you might see the use of grades rather than numbers in my 
> description of evaluative proportional representation (EPR) as even 
> more appreciative of "the consideration that individual candidates 
> hold an over-lapping group or "party" of opinions. Voters support for 
> parties themselves become less and less partisan with more particular 
> choices of parties in proportionally elected multi-member 
> constituencies. So, it may be the CW becomes less and less an absolute 
> individual choice, within the wider context of personal proportional 
> representation, in multi-member constituencies."
>
>     *Evaluative Proportional Representation*
>
> EPR invites you to vote most expressively by grading at least one 
> candidate’s suitability for office as either Excellent, Very Good, 
> Good, or Acceptable. You can grade Poor or Reject for any candidates 
> you find unacceptable to hold office. You can award the same grade to 
> more than one candidate. As follows, you are guaranteed that your one 
> EPR vote of at least Acceptable will quantitatively increase the 
> voting power (weighted vote) in the council of the elected candidate 
> who you awarded the “highest possible grade”.
>
>
>   How EPR Counts Grades
>
>
> For an EPR at-large election of a seven-member council, each of the 
> seven elected candidates must have received one of the seven largest 
> numbers of grades of at least Acceptable from all the ballots cast. 
> Your vote and every other citizen’s vote are added to one of the 
> different /weighted votes /that will be held by one of the elected 
> members of the council. The council represents 100% of the votes cast 
> – no vote is wasted in the sense that it does not help any candidate 
> to win.
>
>
> Except in two circumstances, your one vote adds to the weighted vote 
> in the council of the
>
> highest-graded candidate on your ballot. If you awarded this highest 
> grade to more than one candidate, it is exclusively added to the 
> candidate who will have the largest number of these grades as a 
> result. This is justified by the democratic assumption that, other 
> things being equal, the candidate with a larger number of votes is 
> probably better.
>
>
> _The first exception_ is when that candidate has received too few 
> grades of at least Acceptable from all the ballots cast to be elected. 
> In this event, your ballot is automatically transferred to the 
> candidate on your ballot to whom you awarded your remaining highest 
> grade. If no such eligible candidate is graded on your ballot, your 
> ballot automatically becomes your proxy vote. This proxy is finally 
> added to the weighted vote of the elected candidate publicly judged by 
> your highest-graded candidate to be most fit for office. You can 
> prohibit this use of your proxy vote by specifying this on your ballot.
>
>
> _The second exception_can result from your highest-graded candidate 
> having received /too many highest grades / from all the ballots cast. 
> To avoid the remote but anti-democratic possibility of an elected 
> candidate being able to dictate to the council by retaining more than 
> 50% of all the weighted votes in the council, ourEPR algorithm does 
> not allow a member to retain more than 20% of all the votes cast. This 
> requires at least three members to agree before any majority decision 
> can be made in the council. If the candidate to whom you gave your 
> highest grade received more than 20% of the votes, your ballot could 
> be selected by lot as one of the surplus ballots to be automatically 
> transferred to the remaining highest-graded candidate on your ballot. 
> If no such eligible candidate is graded on your ballot, your ballot 
> automatically becomes your proxy vote and is transferred to the 
> weighted vote of one of the winners as described earlier. As a result, 
> your EPR vote equally adds to the weighted vote of the winner who 
> finally receives your highest grade, remaining highest grade, or proxy 
> vote – the winner you are most likely to see asrepresentingyour hopes 
> and concerns accurately. As a result, each EPR council member has a 
> different /weighted vote /in the council, exactly equal to the total 
> number of ballots counted for them. [Feel free to ask for the 
> published article;Appendix A for a full verbaldescription of the EPR 
> count; the EPR algorithm; or the report of the output for the count of 
> our simulated EPR election. (stevebosworth at hotmail.com)]
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2023 04:28:18 +0000
> From: Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com>
> To: Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>
> Cc: EM <Election-methods at lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] Worst Loser Elimination 2.0
> Message-ID: <9395A19F-634A-4979-8D96-055D5C6B38F1 at ukscientists.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>
>
> Elimination methods may have a policy mandate but they do not have a 
> scientific or knowledge mandate. They violate conservation of 
> (preference) information. Elimination independent of scale of 
> preference is precisely the fault, found over two centuries ago, by 
> Pierre-Simon Laplace, according to JFS Ross, with Condorcet pairing 
> elimination of candidates. It does not take into account the relative 
> importance of higher to lower preferences. Why Laplace sided with 
> Borda amounted to his opening the way to rational counts of preference 
> ranges. Of which Gregory supplied the definitive statistical method to 
> next preferences, of weighting in arithmetic proportion.
>
> It is doubtful whether the Condorcet Winner (or conversely Loser) 
> applies to more than single winner elections, the least democratic, 
> lacking multi-member range of representation. This perhaps may be 
> demonstrated by the consideration that individual candidates hold an 
> over-lapping group or "party" of opinions. Voters support for parties 
> themselves become less and less partisan with more particular choices 
> of parties in proportionally elected multi-member constituencies. So, 
> it may be the CW becomes less and less an absolute individual choice, 
> within the wider context of personal proportional representation, in 
> multi-member constituencies.
>
> Regards,
> Richard Lung.
>
>
> ----
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