[EM] Some thoughts on Condorcet and Burial

[Michael Ossipoff]

For some reason, half of my reply didn’t post, & so I’ll try again now:

…

Chris Behnam said:

…

[quote]

And two, with this model there can be no controversy as to who should win.
Every method has no choice other than to
elect the candidate with the most votes.

[/quote]

…

Yes, that’s the definition of Vote-For-1 (VF1).  The thing is, however,
that some of us don’t like VF1.
…
[quote]

I think one mistake that Blake Cretney made quite a while ago (stemming
from the mind-set I described at the beginning)
was to classify truncation as a variety of Burial strategy.

[/quote]

…

Then Blake Cretney was mistaken.  Truncation can be strategic, or it can be
lazy, or hurried, or due to the balloting only allowing a few
rank-positions.

…

…&, if it’s strategic, it can be offensive or defensive strategy.

…

With wv methods, CW,Implicit-Approval, or MDDA, I’d always employ
defensive-truncation, never ranking anyone whom I wouldn’t approve if the
election were by Approval.  …& would advise others to do the same.

…
[quote]

The voting method should be very happy to assume that presumed (or
imaginary) strict "preferences" that the voter chooses not to
express on the ballot for whatever reason (barring some over-strong
truncation or compromise incentives) simply don't exist.

[/quote]

…

Assuming things isn’t the Condorcet’s job. It’s to count all of everyone’s
pairwise preferences, & elect the candidate whose election they imply.

…

i.e. to elect the “sincere CW” if there is one.

…

That doesn’t say anything about there being an exception in the case where
there’s a “sincere CW”, but no “voted CW” due to offensive-strategy.

…

Perhaps didn’t know it, but critics & opponents of Condorcet reject it
because offensive strategy can defeat a “sincere CW”, &, for some
unfathomable reason, they don’t like that.
…
If that happens, then the method is failing to fulfill its promise to the
voters other than the offensive-strategizers. Condorcet’s purpose is being
defeated.

…

MinMax(wv), CW,Implicit-Approval,  & MDDA don’t let truncation of the CW
prevent hir election  (unless maybe there’s humungous indifference, in
which case it doesn’t matter a whole lot).

…

Those methods deter burial by electing the “Bus” (the candidate under whom
the CW is buried), when the CW’s voters employ defensive strategy.

…

i.e. Don’t rank anyone whom you wouldn’t vote for in Approval, if you want
to deter burial of the CW to elect someone whom you wouldn’t vote for in
Approval.

…

The autodeterrent methods (when the best ones have been chosen) will deter
offensive strategy by electing the Bus with greater probability than the
buriers’ favorite.  …without anyone having to use any defensive-strategy.
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20231208/cd84fc8b/attachment.htm>