[EM] Some thoughts on Condorcet and Burial

[C.Benham]

> And two, with this model there can be no controversy as to who should 
> win. Every method has no choice other than to
> elect the candidate with the most votes.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> Yes, that’s the definition of Vote-For-1 (VF1).The thing is, however, 
> that some of us don’t like VF1.
> …

In the model (initial scenario) I was describing all the voters were 
voting-for-one voluntarily, in a method that allows them to rank
as many candidates as they like.

> With wv methods, CW,Implicit-Approval, or MDDA, I’d always employ 
> defensive-truncation, never ranking anyone whom I wouldn’t approve if 
> the election were by Approval.…& would advise others to do the same.
>
> …
In the case of Winning Votes methods, isn't the correct zero-info. 
strategy the reverse of that, i.e. to rank equal-top all those you would 
approve in an Approval election, and strictly rank
all the others (random-filling if necessary)?

That is one of the reasons I don't like it.

> The autodeterrent methods (when the best ones have been chosen) will 
> deter offensive strategy by electing the Bus with greater probability 
> than the buriers’ favorite.…without anyone having to use any 
> defensive-strategy.
>

What in your opinion is the best (or at least one of the best) of the 
"auto-deterrent" methods?  I'm curious to see a clear definition and an 
example or two.


Chris Benham


On 8/12/2023 5:06 pm, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> For some reason, half of my reply didn’t post, & so I’ll try again now:
>
> …
>
> Chris Behnam said:
>
> …
>
> [quote]
>
> And two, with this model there can be no controversy as to who should 
> win. Every method has no choice other than to
> elect the candidate with the most votes.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> Yes, that’s the definition of Vote-For-1 (VF1).The thing is, however, 
> that some of us don’t like VF1.
> …
> [quote]
>
> I think one mistake that Blake Cretney made quite a while ago 
> (stemming from the mind-set I described at the beginning)
> was to classify truncation as a variety of Burial strategy.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> Then Blake Cretney was mistaken.Truncation can be strategic, or it can 
> be lazy, or hurried, or due to the balloting only allowing a few 
> rank-positions.
>
> …
>
> …&, if it’s strategic, it can be offensive or defensive strategy.
>
> …
>
> With wv methods, CW,Implicit-Approval, or MDDA, I’d always employ 
> defensive-truncation, never ranking anyone whom I wouldn’t approve if 
> the election were by Approval.…& would advise others to do the same.
>
> …
> [quote]
>
> The voting method should be very happy to assume that presumed (or 
> imaginary) strict "preferences" that the voter chooses not to
> express on the ballot for whatever reason (barring some over-strong 
> truncation or compromise incentives) simply don't exist.
>
> [/quote]
>
> …
>
> Assuming things isn’t the Condorcet’s job. It’s to count all of 
> everyone’s pairwise preferences, & elect the candidate whose election 
> they imply.
>
> …
>
> i.e. to elect the “sincere CW” if there is one.
>
> …
>
> That doesn’t say anything about there being an exception in the case 
> where there’s a “sincere CW”, but no “voted CW” due to offensive-strategy.
>
> …
>
> Perhaps didn’t know it, but critics & opponents of Condorcet reject it 
> because offensive strategy can defeat a “sincere CW”, &, for some 
> unfathomable reason, they don’t like that.
> …
> If that happens, then the method is failing to fulfill its promise to 
> the voters other than the offensive-strategizers. Condorcet’s purpose 
> is being defeated.
>
> …
>
> MinMax(wv), CW,Implicit-Approval,& MDDA don’t let truncation of the CW 
> prevent hir election(unless maybe there’s humungous indifference, in 
> which case it doesn’t matter a whole lot).
>
> …
>
> Those methods deter burial by electing the “Bus” (the candidate under 
> whom the CW is buried), when the CW’s voters employ defensive strategy.
>
> …
>
> i.e. Don’t rank anyone whom you wouldn’t vote for in Approval, if you 
> want to deter burial of the CW to elect someone whom you wouldn’t vote 
> for in Approval.
>
> …
>
> The autodeterrent methods (when the best ones have been chosen) will 
> deter offensive strategy by electing the Bus with greater probability 
> than the buriers’ favorite.…without anyone having to use any 
> defensive-strategy.
>
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