[EM] Condorcet meeting

[Colin Champion]

Asking what's wrong with bullet voting is equivalent to asking what's 
wrong with FPTP. The answer is not that it subverts the system, but that 
it withholds information the system would use to good effect. The whole 
of ranked voting theory is based on exploiting the information which 
bullet-voters withhold.
    I think Chris's summary of how his system might work is fair. 
Supporters of minor parties give their first preferences accordingly, 
and compromise with a mainstream candidate for their second preferences. 
Supporters of mainstream parties (the majority) bullet vote. They don't 
consider the merits of little-known alternatives because it's too much 
effort, and because minor parties get squeezed out by the election 
method in any case. This is very much like PR based on plurality (with a 
little compromising thrown in), and unlike PR by STV except insofar as 
FPTP is its limiting case.
    But if this summary is pessimistic, voters might indeed fill in 
ranked preference ballots to a reasonable depth. In this case, it seems 
to me that they're being put to unconscionable lengths for what is only 
a primary, and they have no way of knowing where to stop.
    Such criticisms are futile unless it's possible to do better; but I 
had hoped that my own method was better, in that it achieved roughly the 
benefits of voting to depth four at roughly the cost of voting to depth 
one.
    CJC

On 28/08/2023 21:09, C.Benham wrote:
>
> Forest,
>
> Why not?   If that's what they want to do I can't see any problem.
>
> Given that we have LNHarm no voter has any particular incentive to 
> bullet vote,
> and only those voters who are confidant that their favourite can make 
> the IRV last
> N (or only care about getting their favourite elected) will have 
> incentive to not bother
> indicating any lower preferences.
>
> Some of the voters will be concerned that their favourite won't 
> squeeze in to the
> IRV last N, so they'll give one or two lower preferences so that their 
> single vote
> can be transferred.  This will likely include some who wouldn't bother 
> doing that if
> they weren't honouring preference-swap deals.
>
> Chris B.
>
> On 29/08/2023 3:18 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
>> Well, that wouldn't work so well if everybody bullet voted.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 28, 2023, 10:24 AM Forest Simmons 
>> <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>     For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far.
>>
>>     But the question remains about how to determine the number N.
>>
>>     Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case may
>>     be) on the average primary ballot?
>>
>>
>>     On Sun, Aug 27, 2023, 12:42 PM C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>
>>         I am strongly of the view that the best practical way to
>>         narrow down the field of candidates in one big open primary
>>         to N candidates should be to just use strict ranking ballots
>>         with voters able to rank as many or as few candidates as they
>>         like,
>>         and just select the IRV (aka STV) last N candidatesI
>>
>>
>>         I worry that if the use of approval ballots for this purpose
>>         is promoted, the powers-that-be won't be interested in anything
>>         more complicated than "just select the N most approved
>>         candidates"  and  (if the election is for an important
>>         powerful office)
>>         we will be left with N corporatist clones.
>>
>>         In say the US presidential election, there is (or can be)
>>         quite a bit of time and campaigning between the primary
>>         election and
>>         the main general election, so I don't think it matters much
>>         if candidates without much "approval" in the primary make it
>>         on to
>>         the ballot for the final general election.
>>
>>         Chris Benham
>>
>>
>>
>>>         *Forest Simmons*forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
>>>         <mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfr_qEUF%3DTUVz%3DNP-rt5OkgtkV7VCoOHHeZvmxCwW90vag%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
>>>         /Sat Aug 26 15:03:20 PDT 2023/
>>>
>>>          *
>>>
>>>
>>>         ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>         I
>>>         The choice of n should be flexible enough that if two candidates both had
>>>         more than 70 percent approval, and nobody else got more than 49 percent,
>>>         then n should be only two.
>>>
>>>         Perhaps every finalist should have at least 71 percent (about root .5) of
>>>         the approval of the candidate with the most approval opposition to the max
>>>         approval candidate.
>>>
>>>         That 71 percent parameter is open to adjustment .
>>>
>>>         The idea is that we should admit into the final stage anybody with almost
>>>         as much approval as Chris Benham's max approval opposition challenger.
>>>
>>>         fws
>>>
>>
>
> ----
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