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<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">Asking what's wrong with
bullet voting is equivalent to asking what's wrong with FPTP. The
answer is not that it subverts the system, but that it withholds
information the system would use to good effect. The whole of
ranked voting theory is based on exploiting the information which
bullet-voters withhold. <br>
I think Chris's summary of how his system might work is fair.
Supporters of minor parties give their first preferences
accordingly, and compromise with a mainstream candidate for their
second preferences. Supporters of mainstream parties (the
majority) bullet vote. They don't consider the merits of
little-known alternatives because it's too much effort, and
because minor parties get squeezed out by the election method in
any case. This is very much like PR based on plurality (with a
little compromising thrown in), and unlike PR by STV except
insofar as FPTP is its limiting case.<br>
But if this summary is pessimistic, voters might indeed fill in
ranked preference ballots to a reasonable depth. In this case, it
seems to me that they're being put to unconscionable lengths for
what is only a primary, and they have no way of knowing where to
stop.<br>
Such criticisms are futile unless it's possible to do better;
but I had hoped that my own method was better, in that it achieved
roughly the benefits of voting to depth four at roughly the cost
of voting to depth one. <br>
CJC<br>
</font><br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 28/08/2023 21:09, C.Benham wrote:<br>
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<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:bbbd2d8c-8172-0d0b-f43f-feb00408f41e@adam.com.au">
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<p>Forest,<br>
<br>
Why not? If that's what they want to do I can't see any
problem.<br>
<br>
Given that we have LNHarm no voter has any particular incentive
to bullet vote,<br>
and only those voters who are confidant that their favourite can
make the IRV last <br>
N (or only care about getting their favourite elected) will have
incentive to not bother <br>
indicating any lower preferences.<br>
<br>
Some of the voters will be concerned that their favourite won't
squeeze in to the <br>
IRV last N, so they'll give one or two lower preferences so that
their single vote<br>
can be transferred. This will likely include some who wouldn't
bother doing that if<br>
they weren't honouring preference-swap deals.<br>
<br>
Chris B.<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 29/08/2023 3:18 am, Forest Simmons
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CANUDvfqGm-iO0yfAjB0qg73nxaq57oOYcLvW14vDan2jiFL3EA@mail.gmail.com">
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<div dir="auto">Well, that wouldn't work so well if everybody
bullet voted.
<div dir="auto"><br>
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<div class="gmail_quote">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 28, 2023, 10:24
AM Forest Simmons <<a
href="mailto:forest.simmons21@gmail.com"
moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext">forest.simmons21@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="auto">
<div>For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most
so far.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">But the question remains about how to
determine the number N.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">Why not just use the number ranked (or
approved, as the case may be) on the average primary
ballot? </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
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<div dir="auto">
<div class="gmail_quote" dir="auto">
<div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Sun, Aug 27,
2023, 12:42 PM C.Benham <<a
href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank"
rel="noreferrer" moz-do-not-send="true"
class="moz-txt-link-freetext">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>>
wrote:<br>
</div>
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.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p><br>
I am strongly of the view that the best
practical way to narrow down the field of
candidates in one big open primary <br>
to N candidates should be to just use strict
ranking ballots with voters able to rank as many
or as few candidates as they like,<br>
and just select the IRV (aka STV) last N
candidatesI</p>
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<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<p> <br>
I worry that if the use of approval ballots for
this purpose is promoted, the powers-that-be
won't be interested in anything<br>
more complicated than "just select the N most
approved candidates" and (if the election is
for an important powerful office)<br>
we will be left with N corporatist clones.<br>
<br>
In say the US presidential election, there is
(or can be) quite a bit of time and campaigning
between the primary election and<br>
the main general election, so I don't think it
matters much if candidates without much
"approval" in the primary make it on to<br>
the ballot for the final general election.<br>
<br>
Chris Benham<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</p>
<blockquote type="cite"><b
style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times
New
Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">Forest
Simmons</b><span
style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times
New
Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;display:inline!important;float:none"><span> </span></span><a
href="mailto:election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfr_qEUF%3DTUVz%3DNP-rt5OkgtkV7VCoOHHeZvmxCwW90vag%40mail.gmail.com%3E"
title="[EM] Condorcet meeting" rel="noreferrer
noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">forest.simmons21 at
gmail.com</a><br>
<i>Sat Aug 26 15:03:20 PDT 2023</i><span
style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:"Times
New
Roman";font-size:medium;font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;white-space:normal;background-color:rgb(255,255,255);text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial;display:inline!important;float:none"></span>
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<pre style="white-space:pre-wrap;color:rgb(0,0,0);font-style:normal;font-variant-ligatures:normal;font-variant-caps:normal;font-weight:400;letter-spacing:normal;text-align:start;text-indent:0px;text-transform:none;word-spacing:0px;text-decoration-style:initial;text-decoration-color:initial">I
The choice of n should be flexible enough that if two candidates both had
more than 70 percent approval, and nobody else got more than 49 percent,
then n should be only two.
Perhaps every finalist should have at least 71 percent (about root .5) of
the approval of the candidate with the most approval opposition to the max
approval candidate.
That 71 percent parameter is open to adjustment .
The idea is that we should admit into the final stage anybody with almost
as much approval as Chris Benham's max approval opposition challenger.
fws
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