[EM] Condorcet meeting

[Forest Simmons]

Thanks for those insights!

I hope that the Condorcet Club can see the value of IRV in this context.

On Mon, Aug 28, 2023, 12:09 PM C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

> Forest,
>
> Why not?   If that's what they want to do I can't see any problem.
>
> Given that we have LNHarm no voter has any particular incentive to bullet
> vote,
> and only those voters who are confidant that their favourite can make the
> IRV last
> N (or only care about getting their favourite elected) will have incentive
> to not bother
> indicating any lower preferences.
>
> Some of the voters will be concerned that their favourite won't squeeze in
> to the
> IRV last N, so they'll give one or two lower preferences so that their
> single vote
> can be transferred.  This will likely include some who wouldn't bother
> doing that if
> they weren't honouring preference-swap deals.
>
> Chris B.
>
> On 29/08/2023 3:18 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Well, that wouldn't work so well if everybody bullet voted.
>
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 28, 2023, 10:24 AM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> For practical purposes, this appeals to me the most so far.
>>
>> But the question remains about how to determine the number N.
>>
>> Why not just use the number ranked (or approved, as the case may be) on
>> the average primary ballot?
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Aug 27, 2023, 12:42 PM C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I am strongly of the view that the best practical way to narrow down the
>>> field of candidates in one big open primary
>>> to N candidates should be to just use strict ranking ballots with voters
>>> able to rank as many or as few candidates as they like,
>>> and just select the IRV (aka STV) last N candidatesI
>>>
>>
>>> I worry that if the use of approval ballots for this purpose is
>>> promoted, the powers-that-be won't be interested in anything
>>> more complicated than "just select the N most approved candidates"  and
>>> (if the election is for an important powerful office)
>>> we will be left with N corporatist clones.
>>>
>>> In say the US presidential election, there is (or can be) quite a bit of
>>> time and campaigning between the primary election and
>>> the main general election, so I don't think it matters much if
>>> candidates without much "approval" in the primary make it on to
>>> the ballot for the final general election.
>>>
>>> Chris Benham
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Forest Simmons* forest.simmons21 at gmail.com
>>> <election-methods%40lists.electorama.com?Subject=Re%3A%20%5BEM%5D%20Condorcet%20meeting&In-Reply-To=%3CCANUDvfr_qEUF%3DTUVz%3DNP-rt5OkgtkV7VCoOHHeZvmxCwW90vag%40mail.gmail.com%3E>
>>> *Sat Aug 26 15:03:20 PDT 2023*
>>>
>>>    -
>>>
>>> ------------------------------
>>>
>>> I
>>> The choice of n should be flexible enough that if two candidates both had
>>> more than 70 percent approval, and nobody else got more than 49 percent,
>>> then n should be only two.
>>>
>>> Perhaps every finalist should have at least 71 percent (about root .5) of
>>> the approval of the candidate with the most approval opposition to the max
>>> approval candidate.
>>>
>>> That 71 percent parameter is open to adjustment .
>>>
>>> The idea is that we should admit into the final stage anybody with almost
>>> as much approval as Chris Benham's max approval opposition challenger.
>>>
>>> fws
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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