[EM] Condorcet meeting

[Forest Simmons]

If you want optimal strategy, vote for your Plurality compromise and
everybody you like better.

So Approval improves the result when people apply the "everybody you like
better" clause, and leaves it no worse (nor better) until they get more
familiar with the method.


On Fri, Aug 25, 2023, 4:23 PM Michael Garman <michael.garman at rankthevote.us>
wrote:

> Colin,
>
> Your concern about approval voting is corroborated, at least anecdotally,
> by evidence from Fargo, ND -- the only US jurisdiction to use approval in
> general elections. In 2022, 60%
> <https://citizendata.com/tracking-voter-support-for-electoral-reforms/>
> of voters reported voting for just one candidate in the field of seven. At
> least two candidates (at least according to quotes in an article
> <https://democracysos.substack.com/p/what-fargo-reveals-about-approval>from
> Rob Ritchie) encouraged their supporters to bullet vote for them.
>
> MJG
>
> On Fri, Aug 25, 2023 at 4:52 PM Colin Champion <
> colin.champion at routemaster.app> wrote:
>
>> I’m not persuaded of approval voting. My guess is that voters will
>> bullet-vote for the candidate they like best among those they know about;
>> candidates will encourage bullet voting on their own behalf; pundits will
>> have nothing better to say, and voters will have no motive to award more
>> than the minimum number of approvals.
>>    A danger of quadratic and entropic measures is that they don't impose
>> the constraint that the number of survivors has to be small enough to make
>> ranked voting effective on the second round.
>>    CJC
>>
>> On 25/08/2023 15:05, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>
>> On 2023-08-25 01:50, Forest Simmons wrote:
>>
>> I agree with Kristofer that Approval is plenty good for the narrowing
>> down phase.
>>
>> Your favorite pundits and candidates will definitely make known their
>> recommendations.  Trust your own judgment and gut, as you collate and cull
>> out their llists of recommendations.
>>
>> If there are going to be only six finalists, that doesn't mean you can
>> only approve six or that you have to approve more than one.
>>
>> My rule is to approve my favorite as well as everybody else that I like
>> almost as much.
>>
>> Here's an idea for deciding on n, the number of finalists after the
>> approval ballots have been tallied:
>>
>> For this purpose, temporarily count the ballots fractionally, and let
>> f(X) be the fraction of the total that X gets in this tally ... so that the
>> f(X) values sum to unity.
>>
>> The value of n should be the reciprocal of the sum of the squares of the
>> f(X) vslues... the standard formula for the minimum number of seats that
>> would be acceptable for proportional representation of a diverse
>> population.
>>
>>
>> Another option is to use the exponential of the Shannon entropy:
>> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties#Entropy_measure
>>
>> -km
>>
>>
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>>
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