[EM] Condorcet meeting

[Forest Simmons]

If the voters bullet, no problem ... they should not approve anybody they
don't feel like supporting. Approval frees the voters to approve more than
one if they want ... a freedom they don't have under Plurality FPTP.

But it would be amazing if the result of bullet voting was anywhere near a
uniform distribution...the only case that would make the entropy large
enough to impede the narrowing of the candidate fold.

This level of entropy is so unlikely in this voting context that it is not
worth worrying about.

Think about the election resulting in Arnold's first gubernatorial win in
California. It was FPTP. Yet most of the candidates fell far short of the
front runner averages.



On Fri, Aug 25, 2023, 1:52 PM Colin Champion <colin.champion at routemaster.app>
wrote:

> I’m not persuaded of approval voting. My guess is that voters will
> bullet-vote for the candidate they like best among those they know about;
> candidates will encourage bullet voting on their own behalf; pundits will
> have nothing better to say, and voters will have no motive to award more
> than the minimum number of approvals.
>    A danger of quadratic and entropic measures is that they don't impose
> the constraint that the number of survivors has to be small enough to make
> ranked voting effective on the second round.
>    CJC
>
> On 25/08/2023 15:05, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>
> On 2023-08-25 01:50, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> I agree with Kristofer that Approval is plenty good for the narrowing down
> phase.
>
> Your favorite pundits and candidates will definitely make known their
> recommendations.  Trust your own judgment and gut, as you collate and cull
> out their llists of recommendations.
>
> If there are going to be only six finalists, that doesn't mean you can
> only approve six or that you have to approve more than one.
>
> My rule is to approve my favorite as well as everybody else that I like
> almost as much.
>
> Here's an idea for deciding on n, the number of finalists after the
> approval ballots have been tallied:
>
> For this purpose, temporarily count the ballots fractionally, and let f(X)
> be the fraction of the total that X gets in this tally ... so that the f(X)
> values sum to unity.
>
> The value of n should be the reciprocal of the sum of the squares of the
> f(X) vslues... the standard formula for the minimum number of seats that
> would be acceptable for proportional representation of a diverse
> population.
>
>
> Another option is to use the exponential of the Shannon entropy:
> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties#Entropy_measure
>
> -km
>
>
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20230825/cb1dda55/attachment-0001.htm>