<div dir="auto">If the voters bullet, no problem ... they should not approve anybody they don't feel like supporting. Approval frees the voters to approve more than one if they want ... a freedom they don't have under Plurality FPTP.<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">But it would be amazing if the result of bullet voting was anywhere near a uniform distribution...the only case that would make the entropy large enough to impede the narrowing of the candidate fold. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">This level of entropy is so unlikely in this voting context that it is not worth worrying about.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Think about the election resulting in Arnold's first gubernatorial win in California. It was FPTP. Yet most of the candidates fell far short of the front runner averages. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Fri, Aug 25, 2023, 1:52 PM Colin Champion <<a href="mailto:colin.champion@routemaster.app">colin.champion@routemaster.app</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<font face="Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif">I’m not persuaded of
approval voting. My guess is that voters will bullet-vote for the
candidate they like best among those they know about; candidates
will encourage bullet voting on their own behalf; pundits will
have nothing better to say, and voters will have no motive to
award more than the minimum number of approvals. <br>
A danger of quadratic and entropic measures is that they don't
impose the constraint that the number of survivors has to be small
enough to make ranked voting effective on the second round. <br>
CJC<br>
</font><br>
<div>On 25/08/2023 15:05, Kristofer
Munsterhjelm wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">On
2023-08-25 01:50, Forest Simmons wrote:
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">I agree with Kristofer that Approval is
plenty good for the narrowing down phase.
<br>
<br>
Your favorite pundits and candidates will definitely make known
their recommendations. Trust your own judgment and gut, as you
collate and cull out their llists of recommendations.
<br>
<br>
If there are going to be only six finalists, that doesn't mean
you can only approve six or that you have to approve more than
one.
<br>
<br>
My rule is to approve my favorite as well as everybody else that
I like almost as much.
<br>
<br>
Here's an idea for deciding on n, the number of finalists after
the approval ballots have been tallied:
<br>
<br>
For this purpose, temporarily count the ballots fractionally,
and let f(X) be the fraction of the total that X gets in this
tally ... so that the f(X) values sum to unity.
<br>
<br>
The value of n should be the reciprocal of the sum of the
squares of the f(X) vslues... the standard formula for the
minimum number of seats that would be acceptable for
proportional representation of a diverse population.
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
Another option is to use the exponential of the Shannon entropy:
<a href="https://electowiki.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties#Entropy_measure" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">https://electowiki.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties#Entropy_measure</a>
<br>
<br>
-km
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div>
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</blockquote></div>