[EM] Condorcet meeting

[Forest Simmons]

Yes, the rule of thumb I quoted should be thought of as a quick and dirty
approximation to 2^entropy or e^entropy, depending on whether entropy is
measured in bits or nats.

Here's another related rule whose relevance and convenience is more obvious:

Let n be floor of the quotient of the total number of ballots and the
cumulative support of the cumulative vote winner. [Cumulative votes are
like approval votes, except they are counted fractionally instead of whole.
]

This choice of n makes possible a simple version of STV for selecting the n
runoff finalists.

Let Q be the number of ballots divided by n. The largest faction will be no
larger than this quota, but after eliminations and vote transfers all n
remaining candidate factions will be within one transferred  vote of Q in
size.

Before continuing he pairwise wins and losses are determined once and for
all ... with all ties resolved.

The pairwise loser of the two smallest faction candidates, has her first
place votes transferred respecting their ballot preferences as much as
possible ...consistent with the upper limit imposed by the quota Q.

Once a candidate reaches Q votes, his stash of votes is frozen.

Keep going in this way until exactly n factions remain.

The candidates that correspond to these remaining factions are the
finalists to participate in the runoff ... a runoff that will have its own
method and new ballots.

I recommend for the initial narrowing stage (that we already detailed) an
option of VPR (Vote for a Published Ranking) for those voters that find it
too tedious to generate their own ranking or partial ranking.

I offer this in the spirit of brainstorming ..
 not intending a finished product!

fws

On Fri, Aug 25, 2023, 7:06 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 2023-08-25 01:50, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > I agree with Kristofer that Approval is plenty good for the narrowing
> > down phase.
> >
> > Your favorite pundits and candidates will definitely make known their
> > recommendations.  Trust your own judgment and gut, as you collate and
> > cull out their llists of recommendations.
> >
> > If there are going to be only six finalists, that doesn't mean you can
> > only approve six or that you have to approve more than one.
> >
> > My rule is to approve my favorite as well as everybody else that I like
> > almost as much.
> >
> > Here's an idea for deciding on n, the number of finalists after the
> > approval ballots have been tallied:
> >
> > For this purpose, temporarily count the ballots fractionally, and let
> > f(X) be the fraction of the total that X gets in this tally ... so that
> > the f(X) values sum to unity.
> >
> > The value of n should be the reciprocal of the sum of the squares of the
> > f(X) vslues... the standard formula for the minimum number of seats that
> > would be acceptable for proportional representation of a diverse
> population.
>
> Another option is to use the exponential of the Shannon entropy:
> https://electowiki.org/wiki/Effective_number_of_parties#Entropy_measure
>
> -km
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20230825/90d57d74/attachment.htm>