[EM] Approval-enhanced IRV (take 2)

[Forest Simmons]

On Wed, Aug 23, 2023, 12:29 AM Toby Pereira <tdp201b at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

> But of course, as with STAR, any complex add-on to the method is unlikely
> to ever be adopted, regardless of how much better it is in theory...
>

When an improvement like this one is suggested along with examples of the
problem it fixes and an explanation of why those examples were not just
lucky flukes ... why am I always surprised at the resistance to any thought
about the possibility of change?

There has to be a better explanation than pure obstinacy ... right?

fws

Toby
>
> On Wednesday, 23 August 2023 at 06:59:06 BST, C.Benham <
> cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:
>
>
> Forest,
>
> I'm glad you approve.
>
> So if a voter was giving out too much approval by approving below one of
> the mandatory semi-finalists, the method fixes that faux pas for free!
>
>
> Also the voter might not be making the innocent "mistake" of risking the
> IRV winner being defeated in the final by a candidate they like less, but
> could be trying a relatively easy and tempting Push-over strategy.
>
> Chris
>
> On 23/08/2023 8:54 am, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 21, 2023, 9:36 AM C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:
>
>
> This is I think more appealing and streamlined than my earlier version.
>
> *Voter strictly rank from the top however many candidates they wish.
>
> Also they can mark one candidate as the highest ranked candidate they
> approve.
>
> Default approval is only for the top-ranked candidate.
>
> Determine the IRV winner.
>
> On ballots that approve the IRV winner, approval for any candidate or
> candidates
> ranked below the IRV winner is withdrawn.
>
> Elect the pairwise winner between the (thus modified) approval winner
> and the IRV
> winner.*
>
>
> So if a voter was giving out too much approval by approving below one of
> the mandatory semi-finalists, the method fixes that faux pas for free!
>
> What if the approval cutoff were simply moved adjacent to the IRV winner?
>
> That would probably give the IRV winner's strongest defeater too much
> help, and wrest too much control of the approval lever from the sovereign
> voters.
>
>  It looks like you are treating the malady with the minimal effective dose
> of the right medicine!
>
> Great!
>
> Who will spread the good news?
>
>
> This works fine in the same way as the earlier version in the example
> given to talk
> about Minimal Defense and Chicken Dilemma.
>
> It is more Condorcet efficient than normal IRV, and meets (or comes
> close enough
> to meeting) appropriately modified versions of the LNHs and Minimal Defense
> and Chicken Dilemma.
>
> 49 A  (sincere might be A>B)
> 24 B   (sincere might be B>C)
> 27 C>B
>
> If the C voters B>A preference is strong they can by approving B avoid
> regret for not Compromising.
>
> Then the final pairwise comparison will be between B and A and B will win.
>
> But if they are more concerned about not letting the B voters steal the
> election from them by possible Defection strategy then they can do that by
> not
> approving B.
>
> 49 A>C>>B
> 48 B>>C>A
> 03 C>A>>B
>
> Say this is for a seat in Parliament, and the voters have been
> accustomed to using FPP,
> IRV or Top-Two Runoff. It would cross the mind of no-one that the
> "Condorcet winner"
> C should defeat the IRV (and FPP and even Approval) winner A.
>
> But according to Condorcet advocates the B voters should or could be
> regretting no getting an outcome they somewhat prefer by all top voting C.
>
>
> Well with this system the B and C voters together can "fix" this without
> anyone betraying their favourites or reversing any sincere preferences
> simply by all of
> them approving C and not A.  Then the final pairwise comparison will be
> between C and A
> with C winning.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
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