[EM] STAR

[Forest Simmons]

The best methods that I know of for the friends context are minimum entropy
lottery methods characterized by max possible consensus (min entropy)
consistent with a proportional lottery method with higher entropy fallback
to disincentivize  gratuitous defection.

Jobst's MaxParC (Max Partial Consensus) is the best example.

Too late to elaborate tonight.

fws

I'll

On Wed, Aug 16, 2023, 10:01 AM <fdpk69p6uq at snkmail.com> wrote:

>
> On Mon, Aug 14, 2023 at 12:09 AM C.Benham wrote:
>
>> >   I think this is an interesting point. We can ask at a philosophical
>> level what makes a good voting method. Is it just one that ticks the most
>> boxes, or is it one that most reliably gets the "best" result?
>>
>
> The one that most reliably gets the best result in the real world. The
> difficulty with this approach is accurately modeling human voting behavior
> and the consequent utility experienced from the winner, but it's still the
> better answer philosophically.
>
> (Note that VSE predates Jameson Quinn by decades, and has had several
> different names: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_utility_efficiency)
>
> > And that's partly because the premise of Condorcet is essentially built
>> on a logical fallacy - basically that if A is preferred to B on more
>> ballots that vice versa then electing A must
>> > be a better result than electing B.
>>
>> I'd be interested in reading your explanation of why you think that is a
>> "logical fallacy".  What about if there are only two candidates?
>>
>
> Ranked ballots can't capture strength of preference. It's possible for a
> majority-preferred candidate to be very polarizing (loved by 51% and hated
> by 49%), while the minority-preferred candidate is broadly-liked and has a
> much higher overall approval/favorability rating.  Which candidate is the
> rightful winner?
>
>
> https://leastevil.blogspot.com/2012/03/tyranny-of-majority-weak-preferences.html
>
> "Suppose you and a pair of friends are looking to order a pizza. You, and
> one friend, really like mushrooms, and prefer them over all other vegetable
> options, but you both also really, *really* like pepperoni. Your other
> friend also really likes mushrooms, and prefers them over all other
> options, but they're also vegetarian. What one topping should you get?
>
> Clearly the answer is mushrooms, and there is no group of friends worth
> calling themselves such who would conclude otherwise. It's so obvious that
> it hardly seems worth calling attention to. So why is it, that if we put
> this decision up to a vote, do so many election methods, which are
> otherwise seen as perfectly reasonable methods, fail? Plurality, top-two
> runoffs <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-round_system>, instant runoff
> voting <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting>, all
> variations of Condorcet's method
> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method>, even Bucklin voting
> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bucklin_voting>; all of them, incorrectly,
> choose pepperoni."
> (And strength of preference is clearly a real thing in our brains.  If you
> prefer A > B > C, and are given the choice between Box 1, which contains B,
> and Box 2, which has a 50/50 chance of containing A or C, which do you
> choose?  What if the probability were 1 in a million of Box 2 containing
> C?  By varying the probability until it's impossible to decide, you can
> measure the relative strength of preference for B > C vs A > C.)
> ----
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