<div dir="auto">The best methods that I know of for the friends context are minimum entropy lottery methods characterized by max possible consensus (min entropy) consistent with a proportional lottery method with higher entropy fallback to disincentivize gratuitous defection.<div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Jobst's MaxParC (Max Partial Consensus) is the best example.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">Too late to elaborate tonight.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">fws<br><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">I'll </div></div></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Wed, Aug 16, 2023, 10:01 AM <<a href="mailto:fdpk69p6uq@snkmail.com">fdpk69p6uq@snkmail.com</a>> wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"></div><br><div class="gmail_quote"><div dir="ltr" class="gmail_attr">On Mon, Aug 14, 2023 at 12:09 AM C.Benham wrote:<br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
> I think this is an interesting point. We can ask at a philosophical level what makes a good voting method. Is it just one that ticks the most boxes, or is it one that most reliably gets the "best" result?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The one that most reliably gets the best result in the real world. The difficulty with this approach is accurately modeling human voting behavior and the consequent utility experienced from the winner, but it's still the better answer philosophically.</div><div><br></div><div>(Note that VSE predates Jameson Quinn by decades, and has had several different names: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_utility_efficiency" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_utility_efficiency</a>)</div><div><br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
> And that's partly because the premise of Condorcet is essentially built on a logical fallacy - basically that if A is preferred to B on more ballots that vice versa then electing A must<br>
> be a better result than electing B.<br>
<br>
I'd be interested in reading your explanation of why you think that is a <br>
"logical fallacy". What about if there are only two candidates?<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Ranked ballots can't capture strength of preference. It's possible for a majority-preferred candidate to be very polarizing (loved by 51% and hated by 49%), while the minority-preferred candidate is broadly-liked and has a much higher overall approval/favorability rating. Which candidate is the rightful winner?<br></div><div><br></div><div><a href="https://leastevil.blogspot.com/2012/03/tyranny-of-majority-weak-preferences.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">https://leastevil.blogspot.com/2012/03/tyranny-of-majority-weak-preferences.html</a></div><div><br></div><div>"Suppose you and a pair of friends are looking to order a pizza. You,
and one friend, really like mushrooms, and prefer them over all other
vegetable options, but you both also really, <i>really</i> like
pepperoni. Your other friend also really likes mushrooms, and prefers
them over all other options, but they're also vegetarian. What one
topping should you get?
<p>Clearly the answer is mushrooms, and there is no group of friends
worth calling themselves such who would conclude otherwise. It's so
obvious that it hardly seems worth calling attention to. So why is it,
that if we put this decision up to a vote, do so many election methods,
which are otherwise seen as perfectly reasonable methods, fail?
Plurality, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-round_system" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">top-two runoffs</a>, <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">instant runoff voting</a>, all variations of <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Condorcet's method</a>, even <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bucklin_voting" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Bucklin voting</a>; all of them, incorrectly, choose pepperoni."</p></div><div>(And strength of preference is clearly a real thing in our brains. If you prefer A > B > C, and are given the choice between Box 1, which contains B, and Box 2, which has a 50/50
chance of containing A or C, which do you choose? What if the probability were 1 in a million of Box 2 containing C? By varying the
probability until it's impossible to decide, you can measure the relative strength of preference for B > C vs A > C.)<br></div></div></div>
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