[EM] Unifying DMTC and DMTCBR, and method X criterion
Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_elmet at t-online.de
Sun Aug 13 07:50:29 PDT 2023
Here's a way to unify DMTC (elects a DMT candidate) and burial resistance:
Suppose that candidate A has more than 1/3 of the first preferences, and
beats B pairwise. Then B must not win.
This works because B>A voters can't influence A's first preferences, nor
can they influence whether A beats B pairwise. A neat trick is also that
this can never lead to a cycle, because there can't be more than two
candidates with more than 1/3 first preferences, and A can't both beat B
and B beat A at the same time.
In that spirit, here's a weak criterion that's passed by method X:
Let an election restricted to set S be the election after everybody but
the candidates in S are eliminated. Then if, in every restricted
election involving A and B, A has more than 1/|S| of the first
preferences, and A also beats B pairwise, then B must not be elected.
Here |S| is the cardinality of set S, i.e. the number of non-eliminated
candidates in the restricted election in question.
Method X passes this criterion because when B's finding a maximizing
elimination path, no matter who's eliminated, A always has more than
1/|S| first preferences. Therefore A can never be eliminated, so B is
either forced to be eliminated (in which case he obviously can't be
elected) or his final matchup is against A, who beats him pairwise. On
the other hand, A can do no worse than following the same path, leading
to a matchup against B, which he wins.
It's weak because we need the criterion to hold for all restricted
elections, not just one of them. So the DMT set has to be
well-distributed: all its candidates must have about the same support.
But in return, if the criterion bars B from being elected, voters may
flip pairwise preferences between DMT members and non-DMT members all
they want; it'll never help. Furthermore, a voter lowering his last
ranked DMT set member under a bunch of non-DMT candidates also never helps.
Weak as it is, it could be useful in method design, just like clone
independence. I'll take every handhold scaling this cliff :-)
-km
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