[EM] Approval-enhanced IRV

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 8/6/23 22:28, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> Hi Chris,
> 
> Le dimanche 6 août 2023 à 01:37:25 UTC−5, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> a écrit :
>> The MD criterion has gone a bit out of fashion because it directly contradicts the
>> Chicken Dilemma criterion.
> 
> I'm not sure if MD (even as SDSC) was ever in fashion exactly, but what it is, as you
> know, is a special case of trying to minimize compromise incentive. If you say that has
> gone out of fashion too, well, maybe you'd be right. I don't think CD is the reason for
> that though. In any case I think it would be a mistake for a Condorcet advocate to omit
> compromise incentive from their vocabulary.

The Condorcification logic gives a link between Condorcet itself and 
compromise resistance, namely that if a majority can always compromise 
for X no matter what other candidate was elected, then perhaps one 
should elect X to begin with.

So I wouldn't say that compromise incentive has gone entirely out of 
fashion :-)

 From its perspective, if there is a majority-strength Condorcet cycle, 
then no matter who you elect, there exists a majority who could've 
compromised to get someone else elected, which also would seem to bound 
what can be done.

-km