[EM] Approval-enhanced IRV

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Chris,

Le dimanche 6 août 2023 à 01:37:25 UTC−5, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> a écrit :
> The MD criterion has gone a bit out of fashion because it directly contradicts the
> Chicken Dilemma criterion.

I'm not sure if MD (even as SDSC) was ever in fashion exactly, but what it is, as you
know, is a special case of trying to minimize compromise incentive. If you say that has
gone out of fashion too, well, maybe you'd be right. I don't think CD is the reason for
that though. In any case I think it would be a mistake for a Condorcet advocate to omit
compromise incentive from their vocabulary.

CD doesn't seem like much of an alternative to me. It has a high cost, and the proposed
benefit is speculative, dependent on one set of its resulting incentives prevailing over
another.

> Otherwise elect the winner of the pairwise comparison between the IRV
> winner and the candidate
> with the most approval opposition to the IRV winner.*

Just a comment on this aspect. I'm concerned that on its face it may seem a little unfair
to choose two finalists, such that one finalist has some specific merit, and the other
finalist is someone specifically expected to have high odds of beating the first
finalist. It makes one wonder if the merit of the first finalist is being penalized
sometimes.

This isn't to say I haven't proposed such designs myself.

Kevin
votingmethods.net