[EM] Approval-enhanced IRV

[C.Benham]

Kristofer,

> So I wouldn't say that compromise incentive has gone entirely out of 
> fashion :-) 

And neither would or did I.  In English, there is a big difference in 
meaning between "a bit" and "entirely".

But if you as Condorcet advocate over-emphasise "compromise resistance", 
what is your argument when it is
pointed out that Condorcet is incompatible with Favorite Betrayal and 
suggested that if it is all about compromise
resistance why not get the maximum possible with a method that meets 
Favorite Betrayal?


Chris B.

On 7/08/2023 6:21 am, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
> On 8/6/23 22:28, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>> Hi Chris,
>>
>> Le dimanche 6 août 2023 à 01:37:25 UTC−5, C.Benham 
>> <cbenham at adam.com.au> a écrit :
>>> The MD criterion has gone a bit out of fashion because it directly 
>>> contradicts the
>>> Chicken Dilemma criterion.
>>
>> I'm not sure if MD (even as SDSC) was ever in fashion exactly, but 
>> what it is, as you
>> know, is a special case of trying to minimize compromise incentive. 
>> If you say that has
>> gone out of fashion too, well, maybe you'd be right. I don't think CD 
>> is the reason for
>> that though. In any case I think it would be a mistake for a 
>> Condorcet advocate to omit
>> compromise incentive from their vocabulary.
>
> The Condorcification logic gives a link between Condorcet itself and 
> compromise resistance, namely that if a majority can always compromise 
> for X no matter what other candidate was elected, then perhaps one 
> should elect X to begin with.
>
> So I wouldn't say that compromise incentive has gone entirely out of 
> fashion :-)
>
> From its perspective, if there is a majority-strength Condorcet cycle, 
> then no matter who you elect, there exists a majority who could've 
> compromised to get someone else elected, which also would seem to 
> bound what can be done.
>
> -km