[EM] Ultimate SPE Agenda Processing: Sink Swap Bubble

[Forest Simmons]

OK ... lacking an ndefeated candidate to elect ...

1. Use the RCV ballot informatioren to construct an elimination agenda ...
a list of the candidates with the less favorable near the top of the list,
and the more favorable near the bottom.

2.This list is to be published a week or ten days before the runoff.

3. The runoff ballot is an official copy of this agenda with the following
accompanying instructions:

4. Put a check mark next to the name of every candidate you like better
than any of the candidates listed below it. The check mark is an
abbreviation for BTAOTB "Better Than Any of the Below"

5. Elect the highest candidate on the list that has a BTAOTB check mark on
more than 50% of the submitted ballots.

6. The candidate listed last (bottom) is the default winner (when no other
candidate is preferred over "The Below" by a full majority of the
participating voters).

All registered voters should be able to  participate in this runoff, even
if they did not participate in the first round (the check for a candidate
undefeated pairwise).

It seems to me that the simplicity and importance of the runoff would
attract excellent participation.

Thoughts and suggestions?

-Forest

On Tue, Apr 11, 2023, 1:52 PM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 11.04.2023 19:55, Forest Simmons wrote:
> > Suppose someone provides a list of candidates already sorted pairwise.
> >
> > Now do Benham elimination ... start at the loser end of the list and
> > eliminate candidates one by one until there is (according to a fresh set
> > of ballots) a CW among the uneliminated.
> >
> > How much incentive if any to rank insincerely?
>
> Since Condorcet is incompatible with LNH, there will be some incentive
> to either truncate or random-fill (depending on the situation). I would
> also imagine that if the strategists know the list ahead of time, and
> they know that it's A>B>C>D, then if C is the CW, A is their favorite,
> and A beats B pairwise, they'll have an incentive to engineer a false
> cycle by burying C under B.
>
> If they don't know the list, it's much harder to do. It reminds me of
> the Conitzer and Sandholm preround, which makes strategy harder to
> devise in practice, and just how hard depends on what information the
> strategists have (see
> https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~sandholm/voting_tweaks.ijcai03.pdf). (In
> practice, this doesn't matter, because most elections have relatively
> few candidates; it's just the "it depends on information" aspect that's
> similar.)
>
> -km
>
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