[EM] Public Proposal Verbiage

[Forest Simmons]

El mar., 31 de may. de 2022 12:32 p. m., robert bristow-johnson <
rbj at audioimagination.com> escribió:

>
>
> > On 05/31/2022 1:07 PM Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > I agree with all your sentiments, and will convert to Consistent
> Majority Candidate (or Champion).
> >
> > I'm very satisfied with the method definition, but not so much with the
> suggested tally procedure.
> >
>
> The method definition should simply be:
>
> ...
> (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, a
> Condorcet-consistent retabulation shall be performed by the presiding
> election officer. The candidate, who is the Condorcet winner, is elected if
> the rankings on all of the ballots indicate that this one candidate
> defeats, with a simple majority of voter preferences, every other candidate
> when compared in turn with each other individual candidate. A selected
> candidate defeats another candidate by a simple majority when the number of
> ballots marked ranking the selected candidate higher than the other
> candidate exceeds the number of ballots marked to the contrary.
> (4) If no Condorcet winner exists in subdivision (3), then the candidate
> having the plurality of first preferences is elected.
> ...
>
> This can be made more explicit:
>
> ...
> (3) If no candidate receives a majority of first preferences, a
> Condorcet-consistent retabulation shall be performed by the presiding
> election officer. The retabulation shall examine every possible pairing of
> candidates. Given N as the number of candidates, then the number of
> possible pairings of candidates is N(N-1)/2.  If the number of ballots
> marked ranking a selected candidate over the other candidate exceeds the
> number of ballots marked to the contrary, then the other candidate is
> declared defeated. After all candidate pairings are examined, the candidate
> who remains not declared defeated is the Condorcet winner and is elected.
> (4) If no Condorcet winner exists in subdivision (3), then the candidate
> having the plurality of first preferences is elected.
>

Another way to say (4) is ...
If no Condorcet winner exists in subdivision (3), then elect the candidate
requiring the fewest additional first place votes to become the first place
Majority winner.

My proposal is to change it to ...
(4) If no Condorcet winner exists in subdivision (3), then elect the
candidate requiring the fewest additional first place votes to become the
Condorcet winner.

>

...
>
>
>
>
> Tomorrow, I get to meet Howard Dean again (since he ran for prez in 2004)
> and tell him why I quoted him in my paper https://tinyurl.com/2tety9tj
> and tell him why his claim that I quoted is technically wrong.
>
> The RCV reform effort in Vermont is close to dead, but not quite dead yet.
>
> L8r,
>
> robert
>
>
>
> > I have some ideas ... along the lines of on stage hand counts..n
> >
> >
> > El mar., 31 de may. de 2022 6:58 a. m., robert bristow-johnson <
> rbj at audioimagination.com> escribió:
> > > The neologism that I am promoting is:
> > >
> > > "Consistent Majority Candidate".
> > >
> > > Better than "Beats-all winner" or "Pairwise Champion".
> > >
>
> --
>
> r b-j . _ . _ . _ . _ rbj at audioimagination.com
>
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
>
> .
> .
> .
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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