[EM] Definite Approval/Disapproval

[Forest Simmons]

El sáb., 7 de may. de 2022 9:26 a. m., Richard Lung <voting at ukscientists.com>
escribió:

>
> Kristofer,
>
> Werner Heisenberg said that if in the end you cannot say what you have
> found, then all your finding is worthless.
> Fortunately, voters only need to know how to do the vote. Those who expect
> the count also to be understandable by everyone - typically claimed by
> anti-reformers - talk as if elections were an exception to the division of
> labor.
>

How many congress critters (let alone  American plough boys) have any
inkling of the Webster, Jefferson, or Hamilton apportionment rules, let
alone the Huntington-Hill formula that is actually codified into US law?

("Complicated, that word of fear," as HG Wells described a refrain to STV.)
> My system is an example. I doubt anyone understands FAB STV (I don't
> understand it, or even the much simpler hand count, because it hasn't been
> tested and modified in the light of experience.)
> But all voters need to know is that: You have a preference vote equal to
> the number of candidates. The first preference counts as much to elect a
> candidate, as the last preference counts to exclude a candidate. A blank
> paper ( "white paper" as they call it in France, same as NOTA) is one vote
> towards a seat remaining vacant. Individual preferences left blank also
> contribute, in their degree, to a vacancy.
>
> For example, 10 candidates contest 5 seats. The first five preferences
> count more or less to 5 seat elections. The last 5 preferences count less
> or more, to the exclusion of the other 5 candidates.
>
> Note that the election counts and exclusion counts need not count against
> each other. An exclusion quota consolidates an election quota. In other
> words, a candidate is helped both by popularity and lack of unpopularity.
>
> Regards,
> Richard Lung.
>
>
>
>
> On 7 May 2022, at 6:20 am, Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> That's a good template for all of us to imitate in our outreach to the
> proletariat!
>
> Let me see how well I can imitate it for my latest attempt in the fpA-gpC
> vein:
>
> Candidates are arranged into
> one-on-one match-ups like runoffs where the candidate who would win a
> runoff with only the two wins. If there is a candidate who wins every
> runoff he's part of, he is elected.
>
> Otherwise candidates get reward value for every matchup they win or tie,
> but lose value for every matchup they lose.
>
> The candidate with the greatest net reward value is elected.
>
> Specifically, a candidate's prize/reward value is proportional to its
> estimated formidability as an opponent in these matchups. You get your
> opponent's prize value when you defeat or tie him in a matchup. Otherwise,
> you pay out that value.
>
> The formidability of a candidate is gauged as a function of its respective
> first and last place showings on the ballots.
>
>
>
>
> El vie., 6 de may. de 2022 3:02 a. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm <
> km_elmet at t-online.de> escribió:
>
>> On 06.05.2022 06:19, Forest Simmons wrote:
>> > There were several 3-slot methods I was considering when I started this
>> > thread, but the main one was a version of median judgment first proposed
>> > by Andy Jennings in his dissertstion more than a decade ago. A few years
>> > ago Adrien Fabre  independently published the method as "Usual
>> > Judgment." And last month I discovered the method independently in the
>> > case of three judgment categories.
>> >
>> > As soon as I made a graphic available showing the helical ramp
>> > interpolation that characterizes the method, the versions of Jennings
>> > and Fabre were brought to my attention. Both of them contemplated more
>> > than three categories.
>> >
>> > A Wikipedia article (Highest Median Voting Rules) comparing various
>> > median judgment methods (rightly) affirms that among the known median
>> > judgment methods, Usual Judgment dominates the others in criteria
>> > compliances  ...  resolving nagging imperfections (lack of Reverse
>> > Symmetry and Participation compliances) of Majority Judgment, for
>> example.
>> >
>> > However, the article pointed out that the perfection of Usual Judgment,
>> > especially in the intricacies of its general case tie breaking
>> > procedure, might put too high a demand on the attention span of the
>> > average voter.
>> >
>> > This kind of "problem" is a public relations problem only for methods
>> > whose proponents make too big a deal of the elegance of the arcane
>> > intricacies that do not concern the lay citizen.
>> >
>> > When someone picks up a proposal like MAM, for example, from this EM
>> > list and tries to sell it to the public without filtering out the
>> > technical discussions designed to persuade the other EM experts ... Big
>> > Mistake!
>>
>> For MAM, I think I would put it like this: Candidates are arranged into
>> one-on-one match-ups like runoffs where the candidate who would win a
>> runoff with only the two wins. If there is a candidate who wins every
>> runoff he's part of, he is elected. Otherwise, landslides count more
>> than close runoffs in determining the winner.
>>
>> It would probably be a good idea to also mention that there's been a
>> beats-all candidate in every ranked election known so far. (Except
>> possibly one actual runoff election in Romania, maybe? -- but that
>> wasn't a ranked election.)
>>
>> I'm a theoretician, not a public activist, so I imagine my description
>> could be polished further :-)
>>
>> The truly tough methods to describe would be things like fpA-fpC where
>> the rules seem to be just pulled out of the air with no rhyme or reason,
>> unless you happen to know that it makes the method satisfy some
>> desirable criterion. Or Sinkhorn or Keener, which are incomprehensible
>> without a lot of linear algebra.
>>
>> -km
>>
>> ----
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