[EM] STAR challenge

Ted Stern dodecatheon at gmail.com
Mon Jun 6 21:04:50 PDT 2022

Could you give an example of that max B(x)S(x) calculation?

And how do you guarantee that said candidate is in the Smith Set?

Here's an alternative approval top two/three runoff for you:

Find the approval winner and approval runner up.

Count all ballots that approve of either AW or ARU. Find the approval
winner on ballots that don't approve either, call that the Exclusive
Approval candidate, XA.

If the either/or ballots amount to more that a threshold value, say 75%,
then have a two person general election. Otherwise, include XA as a third
candidate for the general.

On Mon, Jun 6, 2022, 20:49 Forest Simmons <forest.simmons21 at gmail.com>

> VSE (voter satisfaction efficiency) simulations seem to bear out that STAR
> is a significant improvement over plain old Score voting, but not quite as
> good as Score restricted to the Smith Set.
> So it appears that simple STAR is the low hanging fruit worth some trial
> and error tweaking experiments to convert it into the best public proposal.
> Some brainstorming is definitely in order. Ted Stern has been working on
> this.
> Some possible directions:
> 1. Simplify the description of Score restricted to Smith to be on a par
> with the simplest description of STAR
> 2. Find a better runoff opponent for the score winner.
> 3. Compare STAR with Score Sorted Margins and Sequential Pairwise
> Elimination based on a Score agenda.
> Here's one idea:
> For each ballot B, and  each candidate X, let B(X) be ballot B's score for
> candidate X. Let S(X) be the sum over B of B(X). Then the score winner is
> the candidate X that maximizes S(X). Elect the winner of the runoff between
> the score winner and the candidate X that on the greatest number of ballots
> B, maximizes the product B(X)S(X).
> -Forest
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