[EM] Smith//Score ?

[Ted Stern]

Hi Kristofer,

As a Seattle resident, I have been thinking about approval-like primary
methods recently, and was just musing about a 3-2-1 variant with chain
climbing.

It seems to me that Forest's TACC/Q&C variants are almost perfect with 3
candidates, but can have problems with more.

What if there were a method based on a 3-slot ballot [Preferred,
Acceptable, Reject] with an initial round to cull down to 3 candidates?
With Preferred + Acceptable being approved.

My thought was to use a clone-proofed version of Jameson Quinn's Vote321:

Voters give each candidate a score of Preferred, Acceptable, or Reject.

Of the top 3 approved candidates, included the top two Preferred candidates
in the next round.  Call the candidate with higher preference of those two
APW.

Also include the most approved candidate on ballots that don't approve of
APW.

Now you have three candidates, and a ranking from your ballots.

You could run TACC, SCC, or Q&C on the ballots, or use this as a
"top-three" primary for a subsequent election.

A problem with this would be that you could potentially choose a bad combo
of candidates from Smith.

On Tue, Jan 25, 2022 at 1:54 AM Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet at t-online.de>
wrote:

> On 25.01.2022 08:29, Forest Simmons wrote:
> >
> >
> > El lun., 24 de ene. de 2022 2:46 p. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> > <km_elmet at t-online.de <mailto:km_elmet at t-online.de>> escribió:
> >
> >     On 24.01.2022 22:42, Forest Simmons wrote:
> >     > Note that Smith//Score is the same as Smith,Score.
> >
> >     That gives me an idea. How about Smith//Lp-cumulative?
> >
> >     That is, first remove everybody who's not part of the Smith set.
> >     Renormalize all ballots to have unit p-norm. Then greatest score
> wins.
> >     It probably isn't monotone, but the renormalization should mitigate
> at
> >     least some of the Burr dilemma problems of plain Range.
> >
> >
> > Score Chain Climbing generally disappoints both burial and Burr dilemma
> > defectors.
> >
> > That's why it is becoming my favorite method.
> >
> > SCC
> >
> > While more than one candidate remains eliminate the highest score
> > candidate that does not pairwise defeat the lowest score remaining
> > candidate.
> >
> > The Burr defector, like the burial culprit is typically a fairly strong
> > candidate that sees a chance to bury or truncate an opponent that he
> > does not defeat pairwise, but might well come out ahead of if the
> > opponent's score is lowered.
>
> I'll have to check the performance of SCC when/if I make a simulator to
> quick-test methods. I had the impression, though, that it produced some
> strange honest results? That might have been the Borda variant, though,
> so I'm not going to say it's bad on such a weak memory. Or I might be
> misremembering altogether.
>
> By the way, I usually consider the Approval/Range Burr dilemma fallout
> to be mostly about honest miscalculation. E.g. suppose you want to vote
> Perfect > Good > Bad in Approval. You misjudge the polls or vote early
> and so you approve Perfect alone. Then Bad wins because Good doesn't
> have enough support.
>
> If there were only one honest ballot, then deliberately strengthening
> Perfect>others at the expense of weakening Good>Bad would be a strategy.
> But since Approval has multiple honest votes, even honest voters are
> faced with the dilemma. And so they're the ones who have to deal with
> the fallout.
>
> It's kind of like monotonicity that way. Sure, you can strategize with
> it, but that's not why it's bad :-)
>
> -km
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