[EM] Smith//Score ?

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at t-online.de
Tue Jan 25 01:54:04 PST 2022


On 25.01.2022 08:29, Forest Simmons wrote:
> 
> 
> El lun., 24 de ene. de 2022 2:46 p. m., Kristofer Munsterhjelm
> <km_elmet at t-online.de <mailto:km_elmet at t-online.de>> escribió:
> 
>     On 24.01.2022 22:42, Forest Simmons wrote:
>     > Note that Smith//Score is the same as Smith,Score.
> 
>     That gives me an idea. How about Smith//Lp-cumulative?
> 
>     That is, first remove everybody who's not part of the Smith set.
>     Renormalize all ballots to have unit p-norm. Then greatest score wins.
>     It probably isn't monotone, but the renormalization should mitigate at
>     least some of the Burr dilemma problems of plain Range.
> 
> 
> Score Chain Climbing generally disappoints both burial and Burr dilemma
> defectors.
> 
> That's why it is becoming my favorite method.
> 
> SCC
> 
> While more than one candidate remains eliminate the highest score
> candidate that does not pairwise defeat the lowest score remaining
> candidate.
> 
> The Burr defector, like the burial culprit is typically a fairly strong
> candidate that sees a chance to bury or truncate an opponent that he
> does not defeat pairwise, but might well come out ahead of if the
> opponent's score is lowered.

I'll have to check the performance of SCC when/if I make a simulator to
quick-test methods. I had the impression, though, that it produced some
strange honest results? That might have been the Borda variant, though,
so I'm not going to say it's bad on such a weak memory. Or I might be
misremembering altogether.

By the way, I usually consider the Approval/Range Burr dilemma fallout
to be mostly about honest miscalculation. E.g. suppose you want to vote
Perfect > Good > Bad in Approval. You misjudge the polls or vote early
and so you approve Perfect alone. Then Bad wins because Good doesn't
have enough support.

If there were only one honest ballot, then deliberately strengthening
Perfect>others at the expense of weakening Good>Bad would be a strategy.
But since Approval has multiple honest votes, even honest voters are
faced with the dilemma. And so they're the ones who have to deal with
the fallout.

It's kind of like monotonicity that way. Sure, you can strategize with
it, but that's not why it's bad :-)

-km


More information about the Election-Methods mailing list