[EM] Smith//Score ?

[Forest Simmons]

Note that Smith//Score is the same as Smith,Score.

I would like to see how Smith//Score compares with Score Chain Climbing for
burial resistance, etc.

While Smith//Score can elect a covered candidate, Score Chain Climbing
cannot.

Score Chain Climbing is the closest clone free, monotonic method to
Banks//Score.

SCC:
While there remain two or more uneliminated candidates, from among those
remaining eliminate the highest score candidate that does not pairwise
defeat the lowest score candidate.

One reason this method is so burial resistant is because (at any stage
among the remaining candidates) the faction of the highest score candidate
that cannot defeat the lowest score candidate L is the most likely culprit
in the burial of L.

Since L does not pairwise beat itself, it will eliminate itself after all
of its potential buriers have been eliminated, if and only if there remains
another candidate that defeats it.

Note that the SCC winner is elected seamlessly from Banks without having to
compute Banks or Smith.

[This method is Banks efficient because the set of L's is a maximal chain
totally ordered by pairwise defeat.]

A Banks winner is always uncovered because every candidate is beaten by
some member L of the maximal chain, and the Banks winner is not beaten by
any of the L's.

El lun., 24 de ene. de 2022 12:51 p. m., Daniel Carrera <dcarrera at gmail.com>
escribió:

> Could Smith//Score be the ideal strategy-resistant Condorcet method?
>
> The ballot would look like a Score ballot. To process the ballots, the
> scores are converted into rankings (equal rankings allowed), and the
> highest scoring candidate inside the Smith set is elected.
>
> I'm hoping to make a Condorcet method that is very resistant to strategy.
> It's not 100% resistant ---- you can devise an example where there is a
> unique CW and a group of voters alter their ballots to produce a different
> CW that they prefer. Fair enough. But in general the voter has to contend
> with the fact that Score gives you a clear motivation to put your preferred
> candidate on top and your least preferred candidate at the bottom. Trying
> to alter the Smith set by ranking Y>X when you really prefer X>Y is a
> strategy that could work, but it could also backfire if X was going to get
> to the Smith set anyway. My intuition is that any strategy that works for
> Smith//Score (and they do exist) should also work for any other Condorcet
> method. So in that sense, this may be the most strategy-proof
> Smith-efficient Condorcet method.
>
> Cheers,
> --
> Dr. Daniel Carrera
> Postdoctoral Research Associate
> Iowa State University
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see https://electorama.com/em for list
> info
>
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