[EM] Smith//Score ?

Daniel Carrera dcarrera at gmail.com
Mon Jan 24 12:51:23 PST 2022


Could Smith//Score be the ideal strategy-resistant Condorcet method?

The ballot would look like a Score ballot. To process the ballots, the
scores are converted into rankings (equal rankings allowed), and the
highest scoring candidate inside the Smith set is elected.

I'm hoping to make a Condorcet method that is very resistant to strategy.
It's not 100% resistant ---- you can devise an example where there is a
unique CW and a group of voters alter their ballots to produce a different
CW that they prefer. Fair enough. But in general the voter has to contend
with the fact that Score gives you a clear motivation to put your preferred
candidate on top and your least preferred candidate at the bottom. Trying
to alter the Smith set by ranking Y>X when you really prefer X>Y is a
strategy that could work, but it could also backfire if X was going to get
to the Smith set anyway. My intuition is that any strategy that works for
Smith//Score (and they do exist) should also work for any other Condorcet
method. So in that sense, this may be the most strategy-proof
Smith-efficient Condorcet method.

Cheers,
-- 
Dr. Daniel Carrera
Postdoctoral Research Associate
Iowa State University
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20220124/b9cd29be/attachment.html>


More information about the Election-Methods mailing list