[EM] Copeland//Plurality --- can it beat IRV?

[Daniel Carrera]

Hi guys,

As you know, like many of you I am dismayed that so many election reform
advocates are promoting IRV, apparently thinking that it is the only or the
best alternative to FPTP. So once again I'm trying to think of methods that
might appeal to an existing IRV advocate, to see if I can get them to ditch
IRV and pick something that is actually good. In the past you've seen me
ask about BTR-IRV, Benham, Smith[//,,]IRV, etc. So let me present another
idea:

What about Copeland//Plurality?

1) The method is incredibly easy:  "Among the candidates that win the most
head-to-head matches, pick the one with the most first votes."
(yes, I'm setting it so the score for ties is zero)

2) I'm pretty sure that the method is Smith efficient and monotone.

3) For an IRV advocate it might have better intuitive appeal than other
alternatives because it has that Plurality component that some of them
want. I've read IRV advocates say that IRV > Condorcet because the winning
candidate should have strong 1st-place support. I can't imagine any reason
why that would possibly be true, but it means that an X//Plurality method
might appeal to them.

Can anyone help me figure out what properties Copeland//Plurality would
have? Does it have any major downsides that I should know about? It's hard
to see how it could go very wrong.

Cheers,
-- 
Dr. Daniel Carrera
Postdoctoral Research Associate
Iowa State University
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