[EM] STAR cloneproof variant based on Score Chain Climbing

[Ted Stern]

Thanks, Kevin, that's an interesting scenario. Back to the drawing board ...

On Wed, Feb 16, 2022 at 12:58 AM Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr> wrote:

> Hi Ted,
>
> Le mardi 15 février 2022, 14:52:03 UTC−6, Ted Stern <dodecatheon at gmail.com>
> a écrit :
> >>> The clone problem is that A and B could be clones. Removing A's ballot
> >>> contributors finds the non-clone while avoiding pushover incentive. If
> X
> >>> defeats both A and B, it's likely the CW. Otherwise, whichever of A or
> B is
> >>> defeated by X is "weaker" (low probability, but possible in cycles).
> >>> Using a lower-scoring candidate as an eliminator reduces burial
> incentive.
> >>
> >> Not sure I follow. The claim is counter-intuitive because usually a
> candidate to
> >> be given artificial preferences is a weaker one (lower-scoring) because
> the
> >> insincere voters believe this candidate can't win, and don't wish for
> him to win.
> >>
> >> For example in your case if either A or B (doesn't matter) believes
> they will
> >> beat X pairwise then they are able to try to use X to knock the other
> of A/B
> >> out. Just rate X a 1/10, and the other 0/10. No?
> >>
> >> As I say, I think it's not chain climbing generally, but TACC(implicit)
> >> specifically, that has anti-burial value.
> >
> >I'd love to see an example of what you're suggesting. Can you think of
> one?  I
> >don't necessarily need my proposal to win, I'm just looking for the best
> way to
> >cloneproof STAR while still selecting the best candidates.
>
> It might not be easy to make a natural-looking scenario. I think this one
> is at
> least correct:
>
> 0.235: A 10 -------> A 10, X 1
> 0.260: A 10, B 10
> 0.237: B 10, A 1
> 0.265: X 10
>
> I believe the vote change of the first bloc moves the win from B to A. If
> this
> is wrong, I'll take another stab at it.
>
> I'm not saying the method is flawed, I just wanted to scrutinize the
> motivation.
>
> The burial analysis is a little complicated since B can be X, and it's not
> a
> Condorcet method.
>
> Kevin
>
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