[EM] STAR cloneproof variant based on Score Chain Climbing

[Kevin Venzke]

Hi Ted,

Le mardi 15 février 2022, 14:52:03 UTC−6, Ted Stern <dodecatheon at gmail.com> a écrit :
>>> The clone problem is that A and B could be clones. Removing A's ballot
>>> contributors finds the non-clone while avoiding pushover incentive. If X
>>> defeats both A and B, it's likely the CW. Otherwise, whichever of A or B is
>>> defeated by X is "weaker" (low probability, but possible in cycles). 
>>> Using a lower-scoring candidate as an eliminator reduces burial incentive.
>>
>> Not sure I follow. The claim is counter-intuitive because usually a candidate to
>> be given artificial preferences is a weaker one (lower-scoring) because the
>> insincere voters believe this candidate can't win, and don't wish for him to win.
>>
>> For example in your case if either A or B (doesn't matter) believes they will
>> beat X pairwise then they are able to try to use X to knock the other of A/B
>> out. Just rate X a 1/10, and the other 0/10. No?
>>
>> As I say, I think it's not chain climbing generally, but TACC(implicit)
>> specifically, that has anti-burial value.
>
>I'd love to see an example of what you're suggesting. Can you think of one?  I
>don't necessarily need my proposal to win, I'm just looking for the best way to
>cloneproof STAR while still selecting the best candidates.

It might not be easy to make a natural-looking scenario. I think this one is at
least correct:

0.235: A 10 -------> A 10, X 1
0.260: A 10, B 10
0.237: B 10, A 1
0.265: X 10

I believe the vote change of the first bloc moves the win from B to A. If this
is wrong, I'll take another stab at it.

I'm not saying the method is flawed, I just wanted to scrutinize the motivation.

The burial analysis is a little complicated since B can be X, and it's not a
Condorcet method.

Kevin